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Abstract
We study the competitive equilibria in a market with adverse selection and search frictions.
Uninformed buyers post general direct mechanisms and informed sellers choose where to direct
their search. We demonstrate that there exists a unique equilibrium allocation and characterize
its properties: all buyers post the same mechanism and a low quality object is traded whenever
such object is present in a meeting. Sellers are thus pooled at the search stage and screened at
the mechanism stage. If adverse selection is sufficiently severe, this equilibrium is constrained
inefficient. Furthermore, the properties of the equilibrium differ starkly from the case where
meetings are restricted to be bilateral, in which case in equilibrium sellers sort across different
mechanisms at the search stage. Compared to such sorting equilibria, our equilibrium yields a
higher surplus for most, but not all, parameter specifications.
1 Introduction
Since the work of Akerlof (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the properties of market out-
comes in the presence of adverse selection have been the subject of study for many years, both in
Walrasian models as well as in models where agents act strategically. In the latter agents compete
among themselves over contracts which determine transfers of goods and prices, whereas in the
former available contracts specify transfers of goods while prices are taken as given and set so as to
clear the markets. Initiated by Gale (1992), Inderst and Mueller (1999) and, more recently, Guer-
rieri et al. (2010), the use of competitive, directed search models to study markets with adverse
selection has generated several interesting insights. In these models the agents who are uninformed
act as principals. They post and commit to contracts, across which informed agents then allocate
themselves. This framework allows for a richer specification of the terms of contracts available
for trade, which - in contrast to Walrasian models - also include the price to be paid. Market
clearing is in fact obtained by finding the mass of buyers and sellers wishing to trade each contract;
∗We would like to thank Willie Fuchs, Veronica Guerrieri, Ben Lester, Philipp Kircher, Nenad Kos, Sergei Severinov
and Pierre-Olivier Weill for very helpful comments.
‡Department of Decision Sciences and IGIER, Bocconi University, email: sarah.auster@unibocconi.it
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their relative mass, together with the search friction, then determines the probability that buyers
and sellers are matched and hence trade. Renewed interest in this approach has come from recent
developments in financial markets, including the growth of new kinds of market structures as the
OTC markets, less centralized and with less transparent trading conditions.1
A key underlying assumption in the existing literature on competitive search models with ad-
verse selection is that each principal can meet at most one agent. As a consequence, the contracts
which can be posted specify trades and prices that are only contingent on the type reported by
the agent but not on the reports of other arriving agents. It was then shown that there always
exists a separating equilibrium, where agents of different type search for principals posting different
contracts. Principals are in turn indifferent between posting any of the contracts chosen by the
different types of agents, implying that in equilibrium there is no cross-subsidization among the
types. As a consequence, the equilibrium outcome is inefficient - even taking incentive compatibility
constraints into account - when the fraction of higher quality agents is sufficiently large. This re-
sult is analogous to the one obtained in Walrasian models (see Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) and
Bisin and Gottardi (2006)), where, in the absence of search frictions, in equilibrium agents of dif-
ferent types choose to trade different contracts and the no cross-subsidization property again holds.2
We depart from the existing literature on adverse selection and competitive search by allow-
ing principals to meet multiple agents and to post general direct mechanisms that specify trading
probabilities and transfers for agents, contingent not only on their own reported type but also on
the number and reports of other agents meeting the same principal - as an illustration we can think
of an auction as the mechanism governing trades once meetings occur. In particular, we consider
an environment as in Akerlof (1970), with a measure of sellers who are privately informed about
the quality of the good they own, and a measure of uninformed buyers. Quality can be either high
or low and determines both the seller’s valuation and the buyer’s valuation. Buyers then act as
principals and post mechanisms that specify trading probabilities and transfers as a function of
the number of sellers in a meeting and their report. Sellers act as agents, observing all posted
mechanisms and choosing where to direct their search.3 We refer to all buyers posting the same
1There are also papers that study adverse selection in economies where meetings and trades can take place over
a sequence of periods, both in markets with random search, where offers of contracts are made only after meetings
occur, and in markets a´ la Akerlof (1970), where all trades occur at a single price (see for example Blouin and Serrano
(2001), Janssen and Roy (2002), Carmargo and Lester (2014), Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) and Moreno and Wooders
(2015)).
2It is interesting to notice that a similar result holds in the models with dynamic trading mentioned in the previous
footnote: separation in that case obtains with sellers of different types trading at different prices, at different points
in time.
3Of course these are just labels. Alternatively we could think of our environment as the labor market where
principals are firms and agents are workers who are privately informed about their productivity or as a procurement
market where principals are procurers and agents are firms who are privately informed about the quality of their
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mechanism and all sellers searching for that mechanism as constituting a submarket. Within each
submarket, matching is subject to frictions so that buyers are faced with a distribution over the
number of sellers they meet, which depends on the ratio of sellers to buyers in the submarket.
Our main result shows that there exists a unique equilibrium allocation with the following prop-
erties: all buyers post the same mechanism and a low quality object is traded whenever such object
is present in a meeting. The first property implies that everyone visits a single submarket, while
the second property implies that low type sellers receive priority in every meeting. Thus, all sellers
are pooled at the search stage, since they all choose the same mechanism, but are screened at the
mechanism stage, since their probability of trade varies with their type. It is important to point
out that this result does not hinge on any assumption on the relative gains from trade. That is,
even when the gains from trade for the low quality object are arbitrarily small and the gains from
trade for the high quality object are arbitrarily large, high type sellers only get to trade in meetings
where there are no low type sellers. We further demonstrate that all matches between buyers and
sellers lead to trade if and only if the gains from trade for the high quality good are sufficiently
small compared to those of the low quality good. When this is not the case, high type sellers are
rationed in equilibrium, meaning that in meetings where all sellers have a high quality object there
is a strictly positive probability that no one trades. In such situations, additional equilibria exist
in which sellers partially sort themselves at the search stage: buyers post different mechanisms,
attracting different ratios of high versus low type sellers. However, these equilibria yield the same
allocation and payoffs as the equilibrium with pooling at the search stage.
We then consider the welfare properties of the search equilibrium. Since the equilibrium fea-
tures pooling at the search stage, the no cross-subsidization property no longer needs to hold:4 we
show in fact that a buyer’s payoff conditional on meeting a low type seller is strictly higher than
that conditional on meeting a high type seller. We then demonstrate that whenever the gains from
trade of the low quality good exceed those of the high quality good, that is adverse selection is
relatively mild, the equilibrium maximizes social surplus. The result follows directly from the fact
that pooling at the search stage minimizes search frictions and that the equilibrium mechanism
gives priority to the good with the larger gains from trade. On the other hand, if gains from trade
of the low quality good are strictly smaller than those of the high quality good, that is adverse se-
lection is more severe, social surplus is no longer maximal in equilibrium. In such case, we further
demonstrate that the equilibrium allocation can be Pareto improved, subject to the constraints
imposed by incentives and the search friction, if the share of high type sellers is large enough.
project.
4With ’no cross-subsidization’ we refer to the property that buyers make the same profits with both types of
sellers, but these profits do not have to equal zero.
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Finally, we compare our findings with those of the earlier literature on competitive search with
adverse selection where meetings are restricted to be bilateral. To do this, we examine the case
where, in the environment considered, the mechanisms available to principals are restricted to
posted prices. Such restriction on the space of available mechanisms is analogous to a restriction
to bilateral meetings, as it implies that the seller with whom a buyer trades is chosen at random
among all other arriving sellers.5 As one would expect, we find that if the set of available mecha-
nisms is restricted to posted prices, the equilibrium is separating, with two active submarkets, each
of which is chosen by only one type of seller. The separation of sellers at the search stage can be
sustained in equilibrium through different seller-buyer ratios and hence different queue lengths in
the two markets: sellers choose between the possibility of receiving a high price in a market with
a high seller-buyer ratio and a low price in a market with a low seller-buyer ratio.
We then compare the social surplus at the price posting equilibrium with that at the equilib-
rium when general mechanisms are available. We show that in the latter social surplus is strictly
higher for many, but not all, parameter specifications. In particular, when the gains from trade are
higher for the low than for the high quality good, the equilibrium with general mechanisms always
yields a higher surplus because, as mentioned above, social surplus is maximal in that case. More
surprisingly, the equilibrium with general mechanisms also generates a higher total surplus when
it is constrained inefficient and entails rationing, that is when adverse selection is severe. Despite
this, we show that there exist parameter specifications where surplus is higher in the price posting
equilibrium. In particular, we demonstrate that, provided gains from trade are larger for the high
than for the low quality good, this is always case when the ratio of high type sellers to buyers is
large enough.
Related Literature: Besides the literature on competitive search and Walrasian equilibria
with adverse selection mentioned above, our paper is also closely related to the work on competing
mechanisms in independent private value environments. Peters (1997) and Peters and Severinov
(1997) assume the same meeting technology as in our paper and show for such environments that
there exists an equilibrium where all buyers post the same second-price auction with a reserve
price equal to their valuation.6 Subsequent papers examine the features of the equilibrium and its
welfare properties in more general search environments, allowing for example for meeting technolo-
gies where buyers face capacity constraints in their ability to meet sellers, while maintaining the
5Strictly speaking, the restriction to bilateral meetings is equivalent to restricting the set of available mechanisms
to menus such that agents’ trading probabilities and transfers only depend on their own report. Given this constraint,
it turns out that the restriction to posted prices, i.e. degenerate menus, is without loss of generality.
6Note that in this literature labels of buyers and sellers are typically reversed.
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independent private value assumption (e.g. Eeckhout and Kircher 2010, Albrecht et al. 2014, Cai
et al. 2015). In particular, Eeckout and Kircher (2010) show in this setting the connection between
the properties of the meeting technology and the existence of equilibria with ex-ante sorting (at the
search stage) versus equilibria with ex-post screening (at the mechanism stage). The environment
we consider allows to nest a situation with independent private values as a special case where the
valuation of buyers does not depend on the quality of the good. Our characterization of competitive
search equilibria shows that, as one moves away from this particular parameter specification, the
equilibrium mechanism generally differs from the second-price auction identified in the literature
recalled above, while the other features of the equilibrium are robust as long as adverse selection is
mild. In contrast, as adverse selection becomes severe, our results show that the search equilibrium
features rationing of high type sellers, the possibility of partial sorting at the search stage and that
it is constrained inefficient, properties that never arise in independent private value environments.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the economy, the space of mech-
anisms and defines the notion of competitive search equilibrium that is considered. Section 3
presents the main result, stating the existence of competitive search equilibria and the uniqueness
of the equilibrium allocation, and the argument of the proof. The proof is constructive and leads
to a characterization of the equilibrium allocations with different properties in different regions of
the parameter space. The following section then discusses the properties of the equilibrium, in
particular the payoffs attained by buyers and sellers, shows that under some conditions equilibria
with partial sorting exist, and analyzes the welfare properties of equilibria. The final section then
compares the properties of the equilibrium we found to those of the equilibrium which obtains when
the set of available mechanisms is restricted to price postings, showing that welfare is typically,
though not always higher in the first one. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Environment
There is a measure b of uninformed buyers and a measure s of informed sellers. Each seller pos-
sesses one unit of an indivisible good with uncertain quality. The good’s quality is identically and
independently distributed across sellers. Quality can be either high or low and µ denotes the frac-
tion of sellers that possess a high quality good. Let λ
p
= µ sb denote the ratio of high type sellers
to buyers and let λp = (1 − µ) sb denote the ratio of low type sellers to buyers. The buyers’ and
sellers’ valuation of the high (low) quality good are denoted by v (v) and c (c), respectively. We
assume that both the buyers and the sellers value the high quality good more than the low quality
good, i.e. v ≥ v, c > c. For sellers this preference is assumed to be strict, while we allow buyers
to have the same valuation for both types of good, i.e. v = v. When v is strictly greater than v,
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the buyer’s valuation depends on the seller’s valuation of the object, a situation we refer to as the
common value case. This is no longer true when v = v, which we refer to as the private value case.
We further assume that there are always positive gains from trade, meaning that for both types of
good the buyer’s valuation strictly exceeds the seller’s valuation, i.e. v > c, v > c.
Search: Matching between buyers and sellers is subject to frictions and operates as follows.
Buyers simultaneously post mechanisms that specify how trade takes place with the sellers with
whom they are matched. Sellers observe the posted mechanisms and direct their search to one of
the mechanisms they like best. We refer to the collection of buyers posting the same mechanism
and the collection of sellers searching for that mechanism as constituting a submarket. We assume
that markets are anonymous. Anonymity is captured by the assumption that mechanisms cannot
condition on the identity of sellers and that sellers cannot condition their search strategies on the
identity of buyers but only on the mechanism they post (see for example Shimer, 2005). More
specifically, we adopt the assumption that, in any submarket, a seller visits one of the present
buyers at random and that buyers have no capacity constraints, that is they can meet all arriving
sellers, no matter how many they are. As a result, the number of sellers that meet a particular
buyer follows a Poisson distribution with a mean equal to the seller-buyer ratio in the submarket.7
According to this meeting technology, referred to as urn-ball matching, sellers are sure to meet a
buyer, while buyers may end up with many sellers or with no seller at all. Moreover, a buyer’s
probability of meeting a certain type of seller is fully determined by the ratio between sellers of
that type and buyers in the submarket, while it does not depend on the presence of other types
of sellers.8 This property and the fact that buyers can meet multiple sellers are essential for the
following analysis, while most other features of the meeting technology are not.
Under urn-ball matching, a buyer’s probability of meeting k sellers in a market with seller-buyer
ratio λ is given by
Pk(λ) =
λk
k!
e−λ
Since the presence of high type sellers does not affect the meeting chances of low type sellers and
vice versa, the probability for a buyer to meet L low type sellers and H high type sellers in a market
where the ratio between high (low) type sellers and buyers is λ (λ) is given by
PL(λ)PH(λ) =
(λ)L
L!
e−λ
(λ)H
H!
e−λ
7This is one of the most commonly used assumptions in the directed search literature, e.g. Peters and Severinov
(1997), Albrecht et al. (2006), Kim and Kircher (2015).
8The class of meeting technologies that have this property, called ’invariance’ (Lester et al., 2015a), includes the
urn-ball matching technology as a special case.
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Similarly, PL(λ)PH(λ) corresponds to the probability for a seller to be in a meeting with other L
low type sellers and H high type sellers.
Mechanisms and payoffs: We restrict attention to direct mechanisms that do not condition
on mechanisms posted by other buyers. A mechanism m is defined by
m : {(L,H)}L∈N,H∈N → [0, 1]2 × R2,
where L is the number of low messages and H is the number of high messages in a meeting.
Let Xm(L,H), Xm(L,H) and Tm(L,H), Tm(L,H) denote the trading probabilities and transfers
specified by mechanism m for sellers reporting, respectively, L and H. We say a mechanisms m is
feasible if
Xm(L,H)L+Xm(L,H)H ≤ 1,∀(L,H) ∈ N2 (1)
Let M denote the measurable set of feasible mechanisms.
We assume that, when matched with a buyer, a seller does not observe how many other sellers
are matched with the same buyer nor their types.9 Let λ denote the expected number of H reports
and λ denote the expected number of L reports, which under truthful reporting simply correspond
to the respective seller-buyer ratios for mechanism m. The expected trading probabilities for a
seller when reporting L and H, respectively, are then given by
xm(λ, λ) =
+∞∑
L=0
+∞∑
H=0
PL(λ)PH(λ)X(L+ 1, H)
xm(λ, λ) =
+∞∑
L=0
+∞∑
H=0
PL(λ)PH(λ)X(L,H + 1)
Similarly, we can determine expected transfers tm(λ, λ) and tm(λ, λ). The expected payoff for low
and high type sellers if they choose mechanism m and reveal their type truthfully is given by
u(m|λ, λ) = tm(λ, λ)− xm(λ, λ)c
u(m|λ, λ) = tm(λ, λ)− xm(λ, λ)c
9The assumption that a seller cannot observe his competitors’ type is standard. The assumption that a seller
cannot observe the number of competitors in a meeting facilitates notation considerably but is not essential for any
of our results.
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Truthful reporting is optimal if the following two inequalities hold
tm(λ, λ)− xm(λ, λ)c ≤ tm(λ, λ)− xm(λ, λ)c (2)
tm(λ, λ)− xm(λ, λ)c ≤ tm(λ, λ)− xm(λ, λ)c (3)
Note that, since incentive compatibility is defined in terms of expected trading probabilities and
transfers, whether a given mechanism m is incentive compatible or not depends on the values of λ
and λ. Let MIC denote the set of tuples (m,λ, λ) such that m ∈ M and incentive compatibility
with respect to λ, λ is satisfied.
Finally, given that sellers report truthfully, the payoff for a buyer posting mechanism m when
the expected number of high and low type sellers, respectively, is λ and λ, is
pi(m|λ, λ) = λ[xm(λ, λ)v − tm(λ, λ)] + λ[xm(λ, λ)v − tm(λ, λ)]
Equilibrium: An allocation in this setting is defined by a measure β over M , where β(m)
denotes the measure of buyers that post mechanism m, and two maps λ, λ : M → R+ ∪ +∞
specifying, respectively, the ratio of low and high type sellers directing their search to mechanism
m relative to the buyers posting that mechanism. Let Mβ denote the support of β. We say an
allocation is feasible if∫
Mβ
dβ(m) = b,
∫
Mβ
λ(m)dβ(m) = s(1− µ),
∫
Mβ
λ(m)dβ(m) = sµ (4)
We call an allocation incentive compatible if (m,λ(m), λ(m)) ∈ MIC for all m ∈ Mβ. We can
show10 that we can restrict our attention to incentive compatible allocations w.l.o.g.: for any non-
incentive compatible mechanism, there exists a different incentive compatible mechanisms that
yields the same payoff for buyers and sellers as the original mechanism in the reporting equilibrium.
For all m 6∈Mβ, the maps λ(m) and λ(m) specify the beliefs of buyers over the expected number
of low and high type sellers, respectively, that a deviating mechanism attracts. We assume that
buyers’ beliefs are consistent with seller’s optimal choices. More specifically, we assume that a buyer
believes to attract some low (high) type sellers if and only if low (high) type seller are indifferent
between the deviating mechanism and their equilibrium mechanism, while the other type weakly
10For a formal proof see the Online Appendix, available at https://sites.google.com/site/austersarah/
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prefers his equilibrium mechanism. This is captured by the set of the following two inequalities11
u(m|λ(m), λ(m)) ≤ max
m′∈Mβ
u(m′|λ(m′), λ(m′)) holding with equality if λ(m) > 0, (5)
u(m|λ(m), λ(m)) ≤ max
m′∈Mβ
u(m′|λ(m′), λ(m′)) holding with equality if λ(m) > 0 (6)
We then impose the following conditions on out of equilibrium beliefs, λ(m), λ(m),m 6∈Mβ:
i) if (5,6) admit a unique solution, then λ(m) and λ(m) are given by that solution;
ii) if (5,6) admit no solution, we set λ(m) and/or λ(m) equal to +∞ and pi(m|λ(m), λ(m)) equal
to the corresponding limit of pi(m|λ(m), λ(m)) as λ(m) and/or λ(m) tend to +∞;12
iii) if (5,6) admit multiple solutions, then λ(m), λ(m) are given by the solution for which the
buyer’s payoff pi(m|λ(m), λ(m)) is the highest.
Condition i) says that whenever there is one belief regarding the seller-buyer ratios λ(m), λ(m)
for an out of equilibrium mechanism m 6∈ Mβ such that conditions (5) and (6) are satisfied, these
two inequalities determine buyers’ beliefs regarding the deviating mechanism. This implies that,
whenever possible, the beliefs regarding the seller-buyer ratios λ(m), λ(m) for an out of equilibrium
mechanism m 6∈Mβ are set at a positive level such that each type of seller is indifferent between m
and a mechanism in the support of Mβ or at a level equal to zero if the corresponding type of seller
strictly prefers a mechanism in Mβ. That is, the seller-buyer ratios are consistent with sellers’ op-
timal choices also for out of equilibrium mechanisms, as if all mechanisms were effectively available
to sellers. This is analogous to existing refinements in competitive environments with adverse selec-
tion such as Gale (1992), Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) and Guerrieri et al. (2010), among others.
Since buyers have no capacity constraint and since we allow for arbitrary direct mechanism,
including mechanisms where transfers are not contingent on trade, there exist mechanisms for
which a solution to (5,6) does not exist.13 That is, there exist mechanisms such that for any pair
λ(m), λ(m), there is at least one type of seller that strictly prefers the deviating mechanism over
any mechanism in the support of Mβ. For example, a mechanism could specify a participation
transfer that is paid to a seller independently of whether trade occurs or not. If that participation
transfer is large enough, all sellers strictly prefer the deviating mechanism regardless of how many
other sellers are expected to be present in a meeting. Condition ii) specifies that in such case the
11Equivalent conditions appear in Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) among others.
12More precisely, if u(m|λ(m), λ(m)) > maxm′∈Mβ u(m′|λ(m′), λ(m′)) and u(m|λ(m), λ(m)) >
maxm′∈Mβ u(m
′|λ(m′), λ(m′)) for all λ(m), λ(m) ∈ R+, then (λ(m), λ(m)) = (+∞,+∞). If only one of the
two inequalities is violated, say the first one, then λ(m) = +∞, while λ(m) is determined by (6).
13Note that this situation cannot arise in settings where the meeting technology is restricted to be bilateral or
mechanisms are restricted to posted prices.
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seller-buyer ratios λ(m), λ(m) are set equal to infinity, while a buyer’s associated payoff is given by
the corresponding limit.
Finally, if a solution to (5,6) exists, it is typically unique. If that should not be the case, we
follow McAfee (1993) and others and assume, in condition iii), that buyers are ’optimistic’, so
that the pair λ(m), λ(m) is given by their preferred solution. This specification makes deviations
maximally profitable and may thus, in principle, restrict the set of equilibria. We are now ready to
define a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1. A competitive search equilibrium is a feasible and incentive compatible allocation
given by a measure β with support Mβ and two maps λ, λ such that the following conditions hold:
• buyers’ optimality: for all m ∈M such that (m,λ(m), λ(m)) ∈MIC ,
pi(m|λ(m), λ(m)) ≤ max
m′∈Mβ
pi(m′|λ(m′), λ(m′)) holding with equality if m ∈Mβ
• sellers’ optimality: for all m ∈Mβ
u(m|λ(m), λ(m)) ≤ max
m′∈Mβ
u(m′|λ(m′), λ(m′)) holding with equality if λ(m) > 0
u(m|λ(m), λ(m)) ≤ max
m′∈Mβ
u(m′|λ(m′), λ(m′)) holding with equality if λ(m) > 0
• beliefs: for all m 6∈Mβ, λ(m) and λ(m) are determined by conditions i)-iii)
3 Competitive Search Equilibrium
We state now our main result, which characterizes the competitive search equilibria in the environ-
ment described in the previous section.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a competitive search equilibrium with the following properties:
• All buyers post the same mechanism.
• Whenever a low type seller is present in a match, a low quality good is traded.
• The equilibrium is unique in terms of expected payoffs.
Theorem 3.1 states that there always exists a search equilibrium in which sellers are pooled at
the search stage and screened at the mechanism stage. That is, all buyers post identical mecha-
nisms so that everybody trades in a single market and these mechanisms specify different trading
probabilities for different types of sellers. In particular, the equilibrium mechanism always gives
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priority to low type sellers, meaning that a low quality good is traded whenever there is a low type
seller present in a meeting with a buyer. This implies that a low type seller’s probability of trade
strictly exceeds a high type seller’s probability of trade: the probability of trade for a low type
seller is strictly larger than his probability of meeting no other low type seller, while the probability
of trade for a high type seller is strictly smaller than his probability of meeting no low type seller.
It is important to point out that this property of the equilibrium does not depend on the size of the
relative gains from trade or the fraction of high type sellers in the population. That is, even when
the gains from trade of the low quality good are arbitrarily small and those of the high quality good
are arbitrarily large, high type sellers only trade in meetings where there are no low type sellers.
Theorem 3.1 also states that the equilibrium is unique in terms of payoffs. In particular, although
there may be multiple mechanisms selected in equilibrium, all those mechanisms yield the same
expected levels of trade and transfers.
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving the above result. The argument is construc-
tive and proceeds through a series of lemmas and propositions that establish various properties of
the equilibrium outcome. As a preliminary step, we show that, in order to characterize equilibrium
payoffs, we can conveniently restrict our attention to the space of expected trading probabilities and
transfers associated to mechanisms in M , clearly simpler than the original mechanism space. More
precisely, the next proposition provides conditions on expected trading probabilities and transfers
that any feasible and incentive compatible mechanism satisfies and, viceversa, are generated by
some feasible and incentive compatible mechanism.
Proposition 3.2. For any (x, x, t, t) ∈ [0, 1]2 × R2 and λ, λ ∈ [0,∞), there exists a feasible and
incentive compatible mechanism m such that
xm(λ, λ) = x, xm(λ, λ) = x, tm(λ, λ) = t, tm(λ, λ) = t
if and only if
t− xc ≤ t− xc (7)
t− xc ≤ t− xc (8)
λx ≤ 1− e−λ (9)
λx ≤ 1− e−λ (10)
λx+ λx ≤ 1− e−(λ+λ) (11)
Proof See Appendix A.1.
Conditions (7) and (8) are analogous to the sellers’ incentive compatibility constraints (2) and
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(3). It is immediate to see that these two conditions imply x ≥ x, that is the expected trading
probability is higher for low than for high type sellers. The remaining three conditions correspond
to the properties that the mechanism m associated to (x, x, t, t) is feasible according to (1) and that
meetings take place according to the urn-ball technology. In particular, inequality (9) requires that
a buyer’s probability of trading with a high type seller is weakly smaller than a buyer’s probability
of meeting at least one high type seller. The expected probability of trading with a high type seller
is given by the product of the expected number of high type sellers in a meeting, λ, and their
trading probability, x, while the probability of meeting at least one high type seller is given by∑+∞
k=1 Pk(λ) = 1− e−λ. Similarly, inequality (10) requires that the probability that a buyer trades
with a low type seller, λx, is weakly smaller than the probability that a buyer meets at least one
low type seller, 1− e−λ. Finally, inequality (11) requires that a buyer’s probability of trading with
any seller, λx+λx, is weakly smaller than the probability of meeting at least one seller, 1−e−(λ+λ).
It is useful to point out that condition (9) is redundant: x ≥ x together with condition (11) implies
that a buyer’s probability of trading a high quality object cannot exceed his probability of meeting
a high type seller.14
Following Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) and others, we next state an auxiliary optimization
problem of a representative buyer who chooses a mechanism m, together with arrival rates λ(m)
and λ(m), so as to maximize his payoff, taking as given the utility attained by low and high type
sellers, denoted by U and U . Given Proposition 3.2, rather than solving for a mechanism in the
original mechanism space, we can equivalently solve for the expected values of trading probabilities
and transfers associated to the mechanism, x, x, t, t, as long as they satisfy conditions (7-11). In
the auxiliary problem, the choice of arrival rates λ, λ associated to the mechanism is constrained by
the conditions restricting equilibrium beliefs (5) and (6), which can be viewed as a form of partic-
ipation constraints.15 Letting U = maxm∈Mβ u(m|λ(m), λ(m)), U = maxm∈Mβ u(m|λ(m), λ(m)),
this amounts to the optimization problem
max
x,x,t,t,λ,λ
λ(xv − t) + λ(xv − t) (P aux)
14Formally, x ≥ x together with condition (11) implies (λ + λ)x ≤ 1 − e−(λ+λ). This is equivalent to x ≤
1
λ+λ
(
1− e−(λ+λ)
)
≤ 1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
. To see the second inequality, note that the function f(x) = 1
x
(1 − e−x) is
strictly decreasing in x, for all x > 0. That is, f ′(x) = − 1−e−x−xe−x
x2
< 0, ∀x > 0 (the numerator corresponds
to the probability of at least two arrivals given arrival rate x). It should also be noted that limx→0 f(x) = 1 and
limx→+∞ = 0, which implies f(x) ∈ (0, 1), ∀x > 0.
15Letting the representative buyer optimize directly over arrival rates implies that in cases where there are multiple
solutions to (5,6), the buyer picks the preferred pair, which is consistent with condition iii) of the refinement. The
auxiliary optimization problem will not allow the buyer to choose mechanisms for which the set of inequalities (5,6)
does not have a solution. This comes without loss of generality because if U,U > 0, attracting infinitely many sellers
always yields a strictly negative payoff and thus is never a solution of the auxiliary optimization problem. Lemma
3.3 will show that U,U > 0 is always satisfied.
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subject to
t− xc ≤ U holding with equality if λ > 0
t− xc ≤ U holding with equality if λ > 0
t− xc ≤ t− xc
t− xc ≤ t− xc
λx ≤
(
1− e−λ
)
λx+ λx ≤
(
1− e−λ−λ
)
λ, λ ≥ 0
If utilities U and U are such that the solutions of the buyer’s auxiliary problem with respect to
λ and λ are consistent with the population parameters, these solutions identify the mechanisms
that are offered in equilibrium. By consistent we mean that to any solution (x∗, x∗, t∗, t∗, λ∗, λ∗)
of the buyer’s auxiliary problem P aux we can associate a value of β, indicating the measure of
buyers posting the associated mechanism, so that the feasibility condition (4) is satisfied. More
specifically, if the solution to the auxiliary problem is unique, consistency simply requires that
the optimal arrival rates λ∗ and λ∗ coincide with the population parameters λp and λp; in such
case, there is a pooling equilibrium where all buyers post the same mechanism.16 If the solution is
not unique and the optimal values λ∗, λ∗ differ across the different solutions, consistency requires
that the average value of arrival rates equals the population parameters, with weights equal to the
fraction of buyers assigned to each solution; in such case, there is a separating equilibrium where
sellers sort according to their type at the search stage.17
Provided that the solutions to the buyer’s auxiliary optimization problem P aux are indeed
consistent with the population parameter, we can find a set of feasible and incentive equilibrium
mechanisms Mβ such that each mechanism m ∈Mβ corresponds to a solution of P aux. By setting
λ(m) = λ∗ for each of those mechanisms, the respective allocation not only satisfies the feasibility
condition (4) but also all remaining equilibrium conditions. In particular, the two participation
constraints imply that the seller’s optimality condition is satisfied for all mechanisms posted in
equilibrium and that there is no profitable deviation for buyers: given Proposition 3.2, for any
m 6∈ Mβ, the respective arrival rates, trading probabilities and expected transfers must belong to
the constraint set of P aux and thus yield a weakly smaller payoff than a solution of P aux. Similarly,
16The same situation arises if we have multiple solutions of the auxiliary problem but for all of them we have the
same values of λ∗, λ
∗
.
17For example, suppose the buyer’s auxiliary problem has two solutions with arrival rates, respectively, λ1, λ1 and
λ2, λ2. If γ denotes the fraction of buyers posting in market 1, consistency requires γλ1 + (1 − γ)λ2 = λp and
γλ1 + (1− γ)λ2 = λp.
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it is easy to see that any competitive search equilibrium, as specified in Definition 1, has to be
such that the expected values of trading probabilities, transfers and arrival rates associated to
mechanisms m ∈ Mβ solve the buyer’s auxiliary optimization problem.18 In the next section, we
thus proceed to analyse the solutions of P aux.
3.1 Solving the Buyer’s Auxiliary Problem
Before solving the buyer’s auxiliary optimization problem, it is useful to derive some conditions on
the sellers’ market utilities U,U that need to be satisfied in any equilibrium.
Lemma 3.3. At a competitive search equilibrium, we have U ∈ (0, v − c), U ∈ (0, v − c), U > U
and U − U < c− c.
Proof See Appendix A.2
Condition U,U > 0 implies that both types of sellers make strictly positive payoffs in equilibrium.
If market utilities were not strictly positive, buyers would want to attract infinitely many sellers, as
additional sellers would come at no cost but increase each buyer’s probability of trade. Conditions
U < v − c and U < v − c state that a seller’s market utility cannot exceed the gains from trade
of his good. If that was the case, buyers would make losses from such sellers and consequently
prefer not to attract them. Finally, conditions U > U and U − U < c − c assure that in equilib-
rium, incentive compatibility for low type sellers and high type sellers, respectively, can be satisfied.
Next, we can show that the sellers’ participation constraints in P aux can be set binding w.l.o.g.
Consider first the possibility that the buyer only wants to attract high-type sellers, i.e. λ = 0.
By setting x large enough, it is always possible to find a pair t, x so as to satisfy t − xc = U and
t− xc ≤ U .19 That is, the buyer can always find an incentive compatible combination of t, x that
makes the low type seller indifferent. The actual choice of x, t does not affect the buyer’s payoff, as x
and t are multiplied by λ = 0, both in the objective and in the remaining constraints. A symmetric
argument can be made for the case of λ = 0. Solving the participation constraints for t, t and
substituting into the objective function and the remaining constraints, the buyer’s optimization
18Suppose not and let U = maxm∈Mβ u(m|λ(m), λ(m)), U = maxm∈Mβ u(m|λ(m), λ(m)). Then there exists a
tuple (x, x, t, t, λ, λ) that satisfies the constraint set of P aux and yields a strictly higher payoff for the buyer than the
associated expected trading probabilities, transfers and arrival rates of any mechanism m ∈Mβ . By Proposition 3.2
and the conditions on equilibrium beliefs, we know that there exists a feasible and incentive compatible mechanism
m′ 6∈Mβ with associated expected trading probabilities, transfers (x, x, t, t) and beliefs given by (λ, λ), implying that
posting m′ is a profitable deviation for a buyer.
19Satisfying these two conditions requires x ≥ U−U
c−c . By Lemma 3.3, the latter term is strictly smaller than one,
implying that there exists some x for which this inequality is satisfied.
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problem can thus be rewritten in the following simpler form
max
x,x,t,t,λ,λ
λ
[
x(v − c)− U]+ λ [x(v − c)− U ] (P aux′)
subject to
x(c− c) ≤ U − U (12)
x(c− c) ≥ U − U (13)
λx ≤
(
1− e−λ
)
(14)
λx+ λx ≤
(
1− e−λ−λ
)
(15)
λ, λ ≥ 0 (16)
Furthermore, we can show that feasibility condition (14) is satisfied with equality at the optimum:
the optimal mechanism is such that the buyer’s probability of trading a low quality object equals
his probability of meeting some low type seller.
Lemma 3.4. At a solution of the auxiliary problem P aux
′
, the feasibility constraint (14) is always
satisfied with equality.
Proof See Appendix A.3.
This Lemma implies that whenever λ > 0, the optimal trading probability for low type sellers is
given by
x =
1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
(17)
Thus, a low quality good is traded whenever such a good is present in a match. It then follows
that the buyer’s payoff from trading with low type sellers is simply given by λ[x(v − c) − U ] =(
1− e−λ) (v − c)− λU . With probability 1− e−λ, the buyer meets some low type seller and gains
from trade v − c are realized. On average the buyer meets λ low type sellers, to each of whom she
needs to guarantee utility U .
In what follows we will show that the space of admissible values of sellers’ utilities U,U , char-
acterized in Lemma 3.3, can be partitioned into three subregions where different sets of constraints
are binding at a solution of P aux
′
. To this end, we will consider three relaxed problems where, in
all of them, the incentive compatibility for the high type seller (13) is ignored. In addition, the
first problem also omits the incentive compatibility constraint of the low type seller (12), while
the second problem omits the feasibility constraint (15). We analyze in sequence each of these
relaxed problems, identifying the sets of values of U,U for which a solution of the relaxed prob-
15
lem solves the buyer’s auxiliary optimization problem P aux
′
, i.e. for which it satisfies the omitted
constraints. We will show that these sets partition the space of admissible values of U,U and that
the analysis of the relaxed problems provides a convenient way to characterize the solutions of P aux
′
.
Relaxed Problem (A): We begin by considering a relaxed problem with respect to P aux
′
in which not only the incentive constraint for the high type seller (13) but also the incentive
constraint for the low type seller (12) is ignored. It is immediate to see that in this relaxed problem
the feasibility constraint (15) needs to be satisfied with equality.20 Using (17), from condition (15)
we obtain
λx = e−λ
(
1− e−λ
)
Substituting these values into the buyer’s objective yields the following expression for the relaxed
problem under consideration:
max
λ,λ
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c) + e−λ
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c)− λU − λU (A)
With probability 1 − e−λ, the buyer meets some low type seller and trades the low quality good.
With the complementary probability e−λ, the buyer meets no low type seller and trades if and only
if he meets some high type seller, which happens with probability 1− e−λ. The high quality good
is thus traded with probability e−λ
(
1− e−λ
)
.
Lemma 3.5. The solution of relaxed problem (A) for any admissible pair U,U is given by
(i) λ∗ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
∗
= 0 if U ≤ v−cv−cU
(ii) λ∗ = ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
, λ
∗
= ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
)
if U ∈
(
v−c
v−cU, (v − c)− (v − c) + U
)
(iii) λ∗ = 0, λ∗ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
if U ≥ (v − c)− (v − c) + U
Proof See Appendix A.4.
Next, we need to find the values of U and U for which the solution of problem (A) satisfies the
omitted incentive compatibility constraints (12) and (13). These values are characterized in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 3.6. The solution of relaxed problem (A) is also a solution of P aux
′
if and only if one of
the following three conditions is satisfied.
(i) U ≤ v−cv−cU
20If λ > 0, the buyer’s objective is strictly increasing in x and condition (15) provides an upper bound. On the
other hand, if λ = 0, (15) reduces to the feasibility constraint (14), which is satisfied with equality by Lemma 3.4.
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(ii) U ∈
(
v−c
v−cU, (v − c)− (v − c) + U
)
and[
ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
)
− ln
(
U
v−c
)]−1 (
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c) − Uv−c
)
≤ U−Uc−c
(iii) U ≥ (v − c)− (v − c) + U and
[
ln
(
v−c
U
)]−1 (
1− U(v−c)
)
≤ U−Uc−c
Proof See Appendix A.5.
The proof of Lemma 3.6 shows that the incentive compatibility constraint for the high type seller
(13) is always satisfied, while the incentive compatibility constraint for the low type seller (12) is
satisfied either if U is sufficiently small or if U is sufficiently large. If U is sufficiently small so
that it is optimal to only attract low type sellers (λ
∗
= 0), condition (15) is satisfied for all values
of x. Hence, x can be picked freely so as to satisfy the incentive constraint (12). On the other
hand, if market utilities are such that it is optimal to also attract high type sellers (λ
∗
> 0), the
value of U has to be large enough so that imitating the high type sellers is sufficiently unattrac-
tive. This is the case if the second inequalities in conditions (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 3.6 are satisfied.
Relaxed Problem (B): We consider next an alternative relaxed problem with respect to P aux
′
where, in addition to the incentive constraint of the high type seller (13), the feasibility constraint
(15) is ignored. In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint of the low type seller (12) is the
only remaining constraint in which x appears. Given that the buyer’s objective is strictly increasing
in x for all λ > 0, (12) must be satisfied with equality whenever λ > 0, i.e.
x =
U − U
c− c (18)
Substituting this value and (17) into the buyer’s objective, the relaxed problem in the present case
can be rewritten as the following unconstrained optimization problem:
max
λ,λ
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c) + λU − U
c− c (v − c)− λU − λU (B)
Lemma 3.7. Problem (B) has a finite solution for any admissible pair U,U such that U(v − c) ≤
U(v − c). The solution is given by
(i) λ∗ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
∗
= 0 if U(v − c) < U(v − c)
(ii) λ∗ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
∗ ∈ [0,+∞) if U(v − c) = U(v − c)
The buyer’s objective in problem (B) is additively separable in λ and λ. It is concave in λ,21
implying that there is a unique optimal value for λ, and it is linear in λ. If U(v − c) > U(v − c),
21To see this, let g(λ) =
(
1− e−λ) (v − c)− λU and note that g′′(λ) = −e−λ(v − c) < 0.
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the buyer’s objective is strictly increasing in λ. In this case, a solution does not exist because the
buyer would like to attract infinitely many high type sellers. If U(v − c) < U(v − c), the buyer’s
objective is strictly decreasing in λ, in which case it is optimal not to attract any high type sellers,
i.e. λ
∗
= 0. Finally, if U(v− c) = U(v− c), the buyer makes zero profits with high type sellers and
is thus indifferent between attracting and not attracting them.
We show next that whenever a finite solution of problem (B) exists, a non-empty subset of the
set of solutions also satisfies the omitted constraints.22
Lemma 3.8. There exists a solution of relaxed problem (B) that is also a solution of P aux
′
if and
only if U(v − c) ≤ U(v − c). The set of those solutions is characterized by condition (i) and (ii) of
Lemma 3.7 and λ
∗ ≤ λmax, with λmax such that
1
λ
max
(
1− e−λmax
)
=
v − c
v − c .
if v < v and λ
max
= 0 if v = v.
Proof See Appendix A.6.
If U(v − c) < U(v − c) so that λ∗ = 0, the feasibility constraint (15) coincides with (14), which is
always satisfied by Lemma 3.4. If U(v − c) = U(v − c), (15) is satisfied only for λ∗ not too large,
that is only for a strict subset of the values that solve relaxed problem (B). The proof of Lemma
3.8 shows that this set is characterized by λ
max
. It further shows that whenever the solution of
problem (B) is indeed feasible, it also satisfied the incentive compatibility constraint of the high
type seller (13).
It is important to point out that at solutions λ
∗
< λ
max
the feasibility constraint (15) holds as a
strict inequality. This implies that whenever there is a meeting in which all sellers are of high type,
the object is traded with probability less than one. Such rationing is consistent with individual
optimization because buyers make zero profits with high type sellers.
Problem (C): If the values of U and U are such that neither of the previous two relaxed
problems yields a solution that satisfies the original constraint set, the solution of P aux
′
, again
ignoring incentive constraint (13), is such that both the incentive compatibility constraint (12) and
the feasibility constraint (15) are binding.23 The trading probabilities are then determined by (17)
22Note that the subset of values of U,U identified in the following lemma includes the set of values identified in
condition (i) of Lemma 3.6. In this set, the solution of problem (A) corresponds to the solution of problem (B).
23To see this, note that if one of these constraints were slack at a solution of P aux
′
, that solution would be a local
maximum of problem (A) or problem (B). However, for the values of U,U under consideration, the solution to the
first order conditions of problem (A) is unique, while a solution to problem (B) does not exists. A contradiction.
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and (18) whenever λ, λ > 0. As shown in the proof of Lemma 3.8, the feasibility condition (15) is
sufficient to ensure that these trading probabilities also satisfy incentive compatibility constraint
(13). Substituting these values into the buyer’s objective, P aux
′
reduces to the following constrained
optimization problem:
max
λ,λ
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c) + e−λ
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c)− λU − λU s.t. e−λ
(
1− e−λ
)
= λ
U − U
c− c (C)
Lemma 3.9. The solution of problem (C) is given by:
(i) λ∗ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
∗
= 0 if U(v − c) ≤ U(v − c)
(ii) λ∗ = ln
(
λ
∗
1−e−λ∗
c−c
U−U
)
, λ
∗
= Min
{
λ
int
, λ
c
}
if U(v − c) ≥ U(v − c), with λint such that
(v − c)U − U
c− c − e
λ
int eλ
int − λint − 1
(eλ
int − 1)2
(v − c)U − U
c− c +
eλ
int − λinteλint − 1
λ
int
(eλ
int − 1)
U = 0 (19)
and λ
c
such that 1
λ
c
(
1− e−λc
)
= U−Uc−c
Proof See Appendix A.7.
The proof of Lemma 3.9 demonstrates that the correspondence defined by the set of values of
λ satisfying the constraint of problem (C) for any given λ has a discontinuity at λ = 0. If
U(v − c) < U(v − c), the solution obtains at this point and is characterized by condition (i).
If U(v − c) > U(v − c), the optimal value of λ is strictly positive and the solution of problem
(C) is characterized by condition (ii). Finally, if U(v − c) = U(v − c), problem (C) has two so-
lutions, one characterized by condition (i) and the other characterized by condition (ii). Both
solutions belong to the set of feasible solutions of relaxed problem (B) and are given by the pairs
λ∗ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
∗
= 0 and λ∗ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
∗
= λ
max
, with λ
max
as defined in Lemma 3.8.
Taken together, the previous Lemmas partition the space of U,U into three regions, (I)-(III),
illustrated in Figure 1. In region (I), U is sufficiently small relative to U so that either condition
(ii) or condition (iii) of Lemma 3.6 holds. In this region of U,U , imitating a high type seller is
sufficiently unattractive for low type sellers so that the solution of relaxed problem (A) satisfies
the omitted incentive constraints and solves P aux
′
. As U increases, the incentive compatibility
constraint of the low type sellers becomes binding and we enter region (II). Here the solution of
P aux
′
corresponds to the solution of problem (C) where both the incentive compatibility constraint
of the low type sellers and the feasibility constraint are binding. If U increases further we enter
region (III) where the solution of P aux
′
corresponds to the solution of problem (B). In this region,
19
the buyer needs to ration high type sellers in order to satisfy incentives for the low type sellers,
implying that there are some meetings with high type sellers in which there is no trade.24
HIL
HIII L
HIIL
v- c
v- c
U
U
Figure 1: A buyer’s auxiliary optimization problem
3.2 Characterization of the Search Equilibrium
We now characterize the competitive equilibria by finding the values of U , U for which the solutions
of P aux
′
are consistent with the population parameters λ
p
, λp.
Parameter region (I): We investigate first the case where the equilibrium utility levels of
high and low type sellers fall into region (I), that is where the solution of P aux
′
coincides with the
solution of problem (A) described in conditions (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 3.5. Given that the solution
of problem (A) is unique, any equilibrium with utility levels in region (I) necessarily has to be a
pooling equilibrium. The solution λ∗, λ∗ thus needs to coincide with the population parameters
λp, λ
p
, which implies that U and U have to be such that the solution of problem (A) is interior.
This case is characterized by condition (ii) of Lemma 3.5. Solving the expressions of λ∗, λ∗ in that
24Note that the region characterized in condition (i) of Lemma 3.6 is a subset of region (III). In the intersection of
those two regions, problem (A) and problem (B) yield the same solution with λ = 0. In the pure private value case,
these two regions coincide, while the remaining admissible values of U,U fall into region (I). That is, in the private
value case, region (II) is empty and the solution of problem (A) always solves P aux
′
.
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condition for U and U and setting λ∗ = λp, λ∗ = λp yields
U = e−λ
p−λp(v − c) + e−λp [(v − c)− (v − c)] (20)
U = e−λ
p−λp(v − c), (21)
If (20) and (21) satisfy the requirements of condition (ii) in Lemma 3.6, the solution of problem (A)
is indeed interior and satisfies the omitted incentive compatibility constraints. As noticed when
commenting on Lemma 3.6, incentive compatibility for the high type seller is always satisfied,
while incentive compatibility for the low type sellers requires x∗ = e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≤ U−Uc−c .
Substituting (20) and (21) into this inequality yields25
e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≤ e
−λp [(v − c)− (v − c)]
c− c
or simply
1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≤ 1− v − v
c− c (22)
As can be verified, whenever (22) holds, also the conditions for the solution of problem (A) to be
interior are satisfied.26 We have thus proved the following:
Proposition 3.10. If 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≤ 1 − v−vc−c , there exists a competitive search equilibrium in
which all buyers post the same mechanism, characterized by
x =
1
λp
(
1− e−λp
)
, x = e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
, t = xc+ U, t = xc+ U
with U and U as in (20) and (21).
Given that 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
is decreasing in λ
p
and lies between zero and one for all λ
p
> 0,27
condition (22) is always satisfied in the case of pure private values with v = v. It also holds in the
common value case provided that the difference between the buyer’s valuation of the high and low
quality good is sufficiently small and the ratio of high type sellers to buyers λ
p
is sufficiently large.
A necessary condition is that 1 − v−vc−c > 0 or equivalently v − c > v − c, that is gains from trade
are higher for the low than for the high quality object.
In the private value case the existence of a competitive search equilibrium where all buyers
25The same inequality is obtained by directly substituting (20) and (21) into the second inequality of condition (ii)
of Lemma 3.6.
26The solution to problem (A) is interior if U
v−c >
U
v−c and U −U < (v− c)− (v− c) (see Lemma 3.6). Substituting
(20) and (21) into these conditions, the first inequality becomes 1 > e−λ
p
and the second inequality becomes e−λ
p
< 1,
both of which are always satisfied.
27See footnote 14.
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post the same mechanism and sellers are screened ex-post was established in earlier work (e.g.
Peters, 1997).28 Proposition 3.10 generalizes this result, in the environment under consideration,
to the case of common values where gains from trade for the low quality object remain sufficiently
large compared to the high quality good. Peters (1997) also shows that the equilibrium trading
probabilities and transfers can be implemented through a second-price auction with a reserve price
equal to the buyers’ valuation. This property can be seen from the equilibrium characterization in
Proposition 3.10: if v = v = v, market utilities of low and high type seller can be rewritten as
U = e−λ
p
(
e−λ
p
(v − c) +
(
1− e−λp
)
(c− c)
)
, U = e−λ
p−λp(v − c).
In a second-price auction with reserve price v, a high type seller has a positive payoff if and only
if he is the only seller in a meeting, which happens with probability e−λ
p−λp . In this event, his
profit equals the difference between the reserve price v and his valuation c. Otherwise the seller
either looses the auction or pays a price equal to his valuation. A low type seller makes a positive
profit if and only if he is the only low type seller in a meeting, which happens with probability
e−λ
p
. In this event, with probability e−λ
p
, he is the only seller and makes a profit equal to v − c,
while with the complimentary probability 1− e−λp , there are some high type sellers and he makes
a profit equal to c − c. Proposition 3.10 extends this result to the common value case v < v, as
long as condition (22) holds. The trading probabilities are identical to those in the private value
case, however, the specific mechanism implementing them is generally different from this particular
second-price auction.
More precisely, the equilibrium mechanism in this parameter region can be interpreted as a
classic auction, where sellers’ bids are monotone in their type and the lowest bid always wins
the auction. However, if v < v, the equilibrium trading probabilities and transfers cannot be
implemented through a standard second-price auction with some reserve price r, potentially coupled
with a participation fee or transfer p. To see this, note that the low and high type sellers’ payoff
associated to such an auction SPAr,p with associated seller-buyer ratios λ
p, λ
p
are given by
u(SPAr,p|λp, λp) = e−λp
(
e−λ
p
(r − c) + (1− e−λp)(c− c)
)
+ p
u(SPAr,p|λp, λp) = e−λp−λ
p
(r − c) + p
Setting these two payoffs, respectively, equal to U and U as in (20) and (21), we obtain a set of
two equations that are linearly dependent in r and p. As can be verified, this set of equations has
28In this work roles are typically reversed, principals are sellers and agents are buyers. It should also be emphasized
that some of this work considers considerably more general environments regarding the type space (e.g. Peters, 1997)
and the meeting technology (e.g. Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010).
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a solution if and only if v = v.
Parameter region (II): We examine next the case where the equilibrium values of U and U
fall into region (II). In that region, the solution of P aux
′
coincides with the solution of problem (C).
The solution is again unique and hence can only be consistent with the population parameters if it
coincides with λp, λ
p
.29 This requires that the solution of problem (C) is interior and satisfies the
respective optimality conditions in Lemma 3.9 (ii). Setting λ∗ = λp and λ∗ = λp and solving these
conditions for U and U yields
U = e−λ
p−λp(v − c) + e−λp 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
) 1− e−λp
1− 1
λ
p (1− e−λp)
(v − v) (23)
U = e−λ
p−λp(v − c) + e−λp 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)[ 1− e−λp
1− 1
λ
p (1− e−λp)
(v − v)− (c− c)
]
(24)
The following proposition shows that market utilities (23) and (24) lie in region (II) and thus belong
to a competitive search equilibrium whenever 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
∈
(
1− v−vc−c , v−cv−c
)
.30
Proposition 3.11. If 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
∈
(
1− v−vc−c , v−cv−c
)
, there exists a competitive search equilibrium
in which all buyers post the same mechanism, characterized by
x =
1
λp
(
1− e−λp
)
, x = e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
, t = xc+ U, t = xc+ U
with U and U as in (23) and (24).
Proof See Appendix A.8.
Comparing this result with Proposition 3.10, we see that the trading probabilities as a function of
λ
p
, λp are equivalent to those in the previous case, while the expressions of the market utilities dif-
fer. The condition for the existence of this equilibrium can only be satisfied if v > v, that is if there
are common values. The gains from trade for the high quality good can now be larger than those
for the low quality good, provided that the ratio of high type sellers to buyers λ
p
is sufficiently large.
Parameter Region (III): It remains to consider the case where the equilibrium utility levels
fall into region (III), that is where the solution of P aux
′
coincides with the solution of the relaxed
29Problem (C) only has multiple solutions if U(v − c) = U(v − c), which falls into parameter region (III).
30Note that 1− v−v
c−c <
v−c
v−c , provided that v < v. Suppose not. Then
1− v − v
c− c ≥
v − c
v − c ⇔ 1−
v − c
v − c ≥
v − v
c− c ⇔
v − v
v − c ≥
v − v
c− c
which is violated by v > c.
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problem (B). This solution can only be consistent with the population parameters if it is optimal
for a buyer to attract both types of sellers, which is the case if and only if U(v − c) = U(v − c).31
In this case, condition (ii) of Lemma 3.7 shows that the solution of problem (B) is not unique.
We consider first the possibility of a pooling equilibrium. The population parameters λ
p
, λp must
then belong to the set of solutions of problem (B). According to Lemma 3.7, this requires that
λp = ln
(
v−c
U
)
. Hence, we have
U = e−λ
p
(v − c) (25)
Substituting this value into the equality U(v − c) = U(v − c) yields
U = e−λ
p (v − c)(v − c)
v − c (26)
From Lemma 3.8 we know that the population parameters also belong to the set of feasible solutions
of problem (B) if λp ≤ λmax, or equivalently:
1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≥ v − c
v − c
Proposition 3.12. If 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≥ v−cv−c , there exists a competitive search equilibrium in which
all buyers post the same mechanism characterized by
x =
1
λp
(
1− e−λp
)
, x = e−λ
p v − c
v − c , t = xc+ U, t = xc+ U,
with U and U as in (25) and (26).
The condition under which the above equilibrium exists requires that the ratio of high type
sellers to buyers λ
p
is sufficiently small so that 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
is sufficiently large and that the dif-
ference between the buyers’ valuation of the high and low quality object is sufficiently large so that
v−c
v−c is sufficiently small. As before, the condition for equilibrium existence can only be satisfied if
v > v. Notably, we see that the expression of the expected trading probability of high type sellers
is now different from the previous two cases. More specifically, we see that the probability for a
buyer to trade high quality, λ
p
x = λ
p
e−λ
p v−c
v−c , is smaller than the probability for a buyer to be
in a match with high type sellers only, e−λ
p
(1− e−λp). The equilibrium mechanism thus not only
gives priority to low type sellers but also rations high type sellers in meetings where no low type
seller is present. As already noticed when commenting on Lemma 3.8, rationing can be sustained
in equilibrium because buyers make no profits when trading with high type sellers, while they make
positive profits from low type sellers.
31If buyers would only attract low type sellers in equilibrium, we would have U = 0, contradicting Lemma 3.3.
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Since buyers are indifferent between the number of high type sellers they attract, the zero profit
conditions also implies that P aux
′
has multiple solutions with respect to λ. As we show in the next
section, the multiplicity of solutions of P aux
′
implies that other equilibria may exist, where sellers
post different mechanisms that attract different ratios of high and low type sellers. However, all
such equilibria must be payoff and allocation equivalent to the equilibrium characterized in Propo-
sition 3.12. To see this, note that uniqueness of the solution of P aux
′
with respect to λ and the fact
that in equilibrium it must be weakly optimal for a buyer to attract both types of sellers implies
that market utilities U and U are always determined by (25) and (26). Given those market utilities,
the optimal value of x is uniquely pinned down. So is the value x for any mechanism that attracts
some high type sellers, implying that the trading probabilities and transfers of any equilibrium in
the specified parameter region are those specified by Proposition 3.12.
Propositions (3.10)-(3.12) partition the parameter space into three regions. As can be verified,
in each of those regions market utilities U and U are uniquely determined by the exogenous param-
eters.32 Together, these two properties imply that the equilibrium characterized in propositions
(3.10)-(3.12) is unique in terms of allocation and payoffs. The statement in Theorem 3.1 is thereby
established.
4 Properties of the Equilibrium
4.1 Equilibrium Payoffs and Cream Skimming Deviations
In this section we discuss the main properties of the mechanisms that are traded in equilibrium
and of the payoffs attained by buyers and sellers. As stated in Theorem 3.1, in equilibrium all
buyers post the same mechanism (or mechanisms yielding the same expected trading probabilities
and expected transfers). We thus have a pooling outcome where all sellers choose the same market.
However, the equilibrium mechanism implies different values of trading probabilities and transfers
for low and high type sellers, hence there is screening of sellers within the mechanism: in particular,
the expected probability of trade is strictly greater for low than for high type sellers.33. Theorem
3.1 further demonstrates that competitive search equilibria exhibit the property that trade of the
low quality good is maximal. It is interesting to point out that this feature of the equilibrium
holds for all parameter values, in particular no matter how large the gains from trade for the high
quality object, v − c, relative to those for the low quality object, v − c, are. To understand why
this property holds, the following lemma establishes an important feature of the equilibrium payoff
32In all three parameter regions, the conditions pinning down the market utilities are linear in U and U . For the
first region, these conditions correspond to (32) and (33), while for the second region they are given by (19) and the
constraint of problem (C). The third region was discussed in the previous paragraph.
33This property is established formally in the proof of Lemma 4.1
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of buyers in all three parameter regions: the payoff of a buyer conditional on meeting a low type
seller is strictly higher than his payoff conditional on meeting a high type seller.
Lemma 4.1. At a competitive equilibrium we always have x(v − c)− U > x(v − c)− U .
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
Thus, in the environment considered, buyers’ profits are not equalized across trades with low
and high type sellers but are in fact larger with low type sellers. The argument of the proof of
Lemma 4.1 shows why it is not possible for buyers to make higher profits with high type sellers
in equilibrium: if x(v − c) − U < x(v − c) − U , there always exists a profitable cream skimming
deviation, aiming to replace low type sellers with high type sellers while keeping their trading prob-
abilities and transfers unchanged. This deviation is feasible due to the fact that high type sellers
trade with a lower probability than low type sellers. A similar argument applies if buyers make the
same profits with high and low type sellers34. Hence, in equilibrium buyers must strictly prefer to
trade with low type sellers. In such a situation, replacing high type sellers with low type sellers
while keeping their trading probabilities and transfers constant would be profitable but violates the
feasibility constraint x ≤ 1λ
(
1− e−λ). Hence, the property that low type sellers are given priority
by the equilibrium mechanism is closely linked to the one regarding buyers’ profits established in
Lemma 4.1. The lemma also implies that there can be no complete pooling in the competitive
search equilibrium. If different types of sellers would trade with identical probabilities, x = x, and
receive the same expected transfers, t = t, the difference between a buyer’s expected profits with a
high and low type seller would be positive and given by x(v− v).35 The cream skimming deviation
of replacing low type sellers with high type sellers would thus always be profitable.
The property that buyers must make more profits when they trade with low type sellers, even
when the gains from trade of the high quality good are large in relative terms, further implies that
most of these gains are appropriated by the sellers. This can be clearly seen from the equilibrium
values reported in Propositions 3.10, 3.11, 3.12. Consider an increase in the buyer’s valuation
of the high quality good v. If v is sufficiently small, we are in parameter region I, where the
incentive compatibility constraint of the low type sellers is slack. Due to this property, an increase
in v benefits buyers and high type sellers but reduces the market utility of low type sellers. If v
increases sufficiently, we enter parameter region II. Here the incentive compatibility constraint of
the low type sellers is binding. An increase in v again benefits high type seller but now also raises
the market utility of low type seller in order to keep incentives satisfied. The extent to which low
34The profitable deviation in this case consists in attracting a slightly larger number of high types, which is again
feasible due to x > x
35Strict positivity holds only in the common value case v < v. In a pure private value case, a slight modification of
the argument is needed.
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type sellers can profit from an increase in v is bounded above and this bound is reached when
we enter parameter region III. Here U is invariant with respect to the level of v, while U further
increases in v. Incentive compatibility than requires that the high type sellers’ trading probability
x decreases in v. The intuition is that since buyers must make lower profits when they trade
with high type sellers, most of the gains from trade of the high quality object go to the high type
sellers. Given that those gains are relatively large in the third parameter region, the high quality
object must be traded at a high price. Incentive compatibility can then only be satisfied if the
trading probability of the high type sellers is sufficiently small. As a result, we have rationing of
high type sellers in equilibrium and the larger v is, the more severe rationing becomes. Note that
this feature stands in contrast to a monopolistic auction setting, or one with random rather than
directed search, where a larger value of v favours pooling offers and thus leads to a weakly larger
trading probability of the high quality good.
4.2 Rationing and Partial Sorting
As anticipated at the end of Section 2.2, the fact that in region III buyers make zero profits with
the high type sellers has another important implication: since buyers are indifferent between how
many high type sellers they attract, the search equilibrium may exhibit partial sorting at the search
stage. More precisely, in what follows we show that in region III there exist additional equilibria,
where different mechanisms are traded, attracting different ratios of high type sellers to buyers.
Suppose two submarkets are active in equilibrium, labelled 1 and 2, with seller-buyer ratios
λ1, λ1 and λ2, λ2, respectively, and assume λ2 = 0. Let the trading probabilities in the two submar-
kets be denoted by x1, x1 and x2, x2 and let γ denote the fraction of buyers posting mechanism 1.
In a sorting equilibrium, choosing either submarket has to be optimal for buyers, which according
to Lemma 3.7 is the case if
λ1 = λ2 = ln
(
v − c
U
)
= λp, and x1 = x2 =
1
λp
(1− e−λp)
As argued in Section 2.2, the market utilities U and U must be as in (25) and (26), and x1 =
e−λ
p v−c
v−c , as in the pooling equilibrium, while x2 can be chosen freely as long as incentive compat-
ibility for the low type sellers is satisfied.36 Feasibility is then satisfied if the following condition
holds
γλ1 + (1− γ)λ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= λ
p
with λ1 ≤ λmax. Recalling that 1λmax
(
1− e−λmax
)
= v−cv−c , this condition can always be satisfied for
36For example, x2 = x1.
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an interval of values of γ sufficiently close to one as long as we are in the interior of region III, that
is if 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
> v−cv−c . The property that γ is large enough corresponds to the requirement that
sufficiently many buyers and low type sellers post and search in submarket 1, the market where
both types of objects are traded.
In the situation described, two mechanisms coexist in equilibrium. In submarket 2 buyers post
a simple mechanism (effectively a price) that only attracts low type sellers, while in submarket 1
buyers post a more complex mechanism (some form of auction) attracting both high and low type
sellers. Evidently, one can also construct other sorting equilibria, where two or more mechanisms
are traded, attracting different ratios of high type sellers. However, all these equilibria are payoff
equivalent to the pooling equilibrium described in Proposition 3.12.
4.3 Welfare Properties of Equilibria
In the economy under consideration the level of total surplus coincides with the realized gains from
trade. At an allocation where the trading probabilities are, respectively, x and x for the high and
low type sellers it is then given by
b
[
λ
p
x(v − c) + λpx(v − c)
]
The welfare properties of the search equilibria we characterized depend on the parameter values of
the economy. We first establish the following:
Proposition 4.2. If v − c ≥ v − c and 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≤ v−cv−c , the competitive search equilibrium
maximizes total surplus among all feasible allocations.
The first condition in the statement of Proposition 4.2 says that the gains from trade are higher
when trade occurs with the low type than with the high type seller. Under this condition, total
surplus b
[
λ
p
x(v − c) + λpx(v − c)
]
is maximal if, subject to the meeting friction, total trade is
maximal and low quality is traded whenever possible. In the competitive search equilibrium the
latter property is always satisfied by Lemma 3.4, according to which a buyer’s probability of trading
a low quality good is equal to a buyer’s probability of meeting a low type seller. Turning to the first
property, total trade is maximal if the allocation maximizes the total number of meetings subject
to the friction and if every meeting leads to trade. The requirement that every meeting leads to
trade is satisfied in equilibrium if the feasibility constraint (15) holds with equality. The second
condition in Proposition 4.2, 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≤ v−cv−c , implies that we are in parameter regions (I) or
(II), where (15) is indeed satisfied as equality. To complete the proof it remains then to show that
also the total number of meetings is maximal. It is well known that under the urn-ball meeting
technology the total number of meetings is maximal whenever the expected queue length is the
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same for all the mechanisms traded in equilibrium37 This is indeed the case in the competitive
search equilibrium, since sellers are pooled at the search stage.
Note that the two conditions of Proposition 4.2 are always satisfied in the pure private value
case, v = v. The result that the competitive search equilibrium maximizes social surplus in pri-
vate value environments is well established in the literature (see for example Eeckhout and Kircher
2010).38 Proposition 4.2 extends this result to the more general case where the gains from trade
are larger for the low quality object, provided the ratio of high type sellers to buyers is not too
low. It is interesting to point out that the only constraint that is considered here is the matching
friction, while incentive compatibility does not constrain attainable welfare.
Whenever the gains from trade of the low quality object are strictly smaller than those of the
high quality object, that is when the common value component of the agents’ private information
as captured by the difference v − v is sufficiently large, the allocation of the competitive search
equilibrium no longer maximizes total surplus. In this case we would like the high quality good to
be traded whenever possible, however incentive constraints clearly limit such trades. We show in
the next proposition that, even taking the incentive constraints into account, surplus is no longer
maximal at the search equilibrium. Moreover, if the fraction of high type sellers is sufficiently large,
there exists an allocation that satisfies the constraints imposed by the matching friction and in-
centive compatibility and Pareto improves on the allocation of the competitive search equilibrium.
In such case, the gains made trading with high type sellers are enough to compensate the possi-
ble losses with low type sellers, implying that the competitive search equilibrium is constrained
inefficient.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that v− c < v− c. Then there exists a feasible and incentive compatible
allocation that attains a higher level of social surplus than at the competitive equilibrium. Moreover,
the allocation constitutes a Pareto improvement if one of the two following conditions are satisfied:
(i) 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≤ v−cv−c and µ ≥ c−cv−v
(ii) 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
> v−cv−c and µ ≥ c−cv−c
Proof See Appendix A.10.
37See for example Eeckout and Kircher (2010). For completeness of the argument we provide a formal proof of this
property in our environment in the Online Appendix.
38In fact Cai et al. (2015) demonstrate for the private value case that pooling at the search stage maximizes social
surplus under any type distribution if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a property called ’love for variety’.
According to this property, in the binary type case, the probability of meeting at least one low type seller is a concave
function of the ratio of low type sellers to buyers and the ratio of high type sellers to buyers. The condition entails
that social surplus can be increased by merging any two submarkets, irrespective of their composition.
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The proof of the proposition shows that an increase in the trading probability of high type sellers,
relative to their level of trade at the search equilibrium, is both feasible and incentive compatible.
Such an increase, possibly combined with a suitable reduction in the trading probability of the
low type sellers, is in fact always a feasible change of the equilibrium allocation. In addition, the
expected transfers to the high and low type sellers can always be suitably adjusted so as to ensure
that incentive compatibility is satisfied. This change in the allocation always increases social sur-
plus when the gains from trade are larger for the high quality good and improves sellers’ utility.
We then show that it also constitutes a Pareto improvement, in the sense that buyers also gain,
provided the fraction of high type sellers in the population is sufficiently high. It is interesting to
point out that the inefficiency of the search equilibrium obtains not only under condition (ii), when
the equilibrium displays rationing, but also under (i), where the feasibility constraint is satisfied
with equality in equilibrium and every meeting leads to trade.
The inefficiency of the competitive search equilibrium with private information of the common
value type is related to analogous results obtained for different structures of markets (see Gale
(1992), Guerrieri et al. (2010) for the case of competitive search equilibria when meetings are
restricted to be bilateral39, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) and Bisin and Gottardi (2006) for com-
petitive equilibria in the absence of search frictions). The common feature to all these results is that
the equilibrium is separating, with different mechanisms traded by low and high type sellers and
buyers being indifferent between trading with any of the two types. In contrast, in the environment
considered here, the space of possible mechanisms exploits the richness of the possible meetings be-
tween buyers and sellers allowed by the random meeting technology and the equilibrium is pooling
with a single mechanism traded in equilibrium, though the implied trading probabilities of high
and low type sellers are different. Also, as we noticed earlier, buyers’ profits are not equalized
across sellers types. However both in the environment considered here and in the work recalled
above, the source of the inefficiency is the low trading probability of high type sellers, and a welfare
improvement is attained by bringing their probability of trade closer to that of low type sellers.40
The reason why at the competitive search equilibrium characterized in Section 2 there is no
profitable deviation that allows to capture the additional gains from trade is that such deviation,
similarly to the papers above, would attract too many low type sellers in order to be profitable.
To see this, notice that, in order to increase the trading probability of high type sellers, a buyer
would have to give an additional information rent to low type sellers, which implies that all low
type sellers would have strict incentives to switch to the deviating contract, up to the point where
39See the next section for further discussion of the relationship with this work.
40As recalled above, this stands in contrast to a monopolistic setting, where for µ large enough the equilibrium
contract features equal trading probabilities for both types.
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their expected payoff from the deviating contract is driven down again to their market utility.41
5 Sorting Versus Screening
An important benchmark for our analysis is provided by the results obtained in earlier work on
competitive equilibria with directed search in markets with adverse selection (see Gale (1992),
Inderst Muller (2002), Guerrieri et al. (2010)). These papers restrict attention to the case where
meetings are bilateral, that is where each buyer can meet at most one seller, and show that,
under this restriction, the competitive search equilibrium exhibits ex-ante sorting instead of ex-post
screening. Restricting the matching technology to bilateral meetings is analogous to restricting the
set of available mechanisms to posted prices. In either case, a buyer picks one of the arriving sellers
at random. In our environment we can capture the restriction of the set of feasible mechanisms
to posted prices by requiring expected trading probabilities and prices to satisfy, respectively,
x = x = 1
λ+λ
(
1− e−λ−λ
)
and t = t. Under this restriction, the set of mechanisms available to
buyers is such that every meeting leads to trade and no type of seller receives priority.42 The next
proposition shows that, given this restriction on admissible mechanisms, the equilibrium outcome,
as one should expect, displays ex-ante sorting instead of ex-post screening.
Proposition 5.1. If the set of available mechanism is restricted to posted prices, the competitive
search equilibrium exists and has the following properties:
• a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1) of buyers post price ph and only attract high type sellers;
• the remaining fraction 1 − γ ∈ (0, 1] of buyers post price pl < ph and only attract low type
sellers.
Proof See the Online Appendix.
Under the stated restriction, the auxiliary problem of a buyer simplifies, as feasibility and incentive
compatibility always hold, and we are left with the participation constraints only. We then show
in the proof that buyers never find it optimal to attract both types of sellers. The proof further
demonstrates that, if the gains from trade for the low quality good are considerably larger than
41Formally, if a buyer posts a mechanism m that yields a payoff for low type sellers strictly larger than U for any
pair λ, λ, the buyer’s belief is pinned down by condition (ii) of the refinement, i.e. λ(m) = +∞. Given this belief,
the deviating contract always yields a strictly negative payoff for the buyer. On the other hand, if the buyer post a
mechanism for which a solution to (5,6) exists, the pair of seller-buyer ratios is such that the deviating mechanism
yields the market utility for low type seller, implying that low type sellers cannot receive an additional information
rent.
42In principle, we could also allow for general menus. Upon being randomly chosen by a buyer, a seller would then
have to chose between two contracts in the menu. For a buyer, such menus are always dominated by posted prices,
as shown in Guerrieri et al. (2010).
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the gains from trade for the high quality good, in equilibrium buyers strictly prefer to attract low
type sellers, while high type sellers are excluded from trade. If this is not the case, a fraction of
buyers post prices that only attract high type sellers, while the others post prices that attract low
type sellers and, given the implied arrival rates in each market, all buyers are indifferent between
posting any of the two prices.
The analysis in Section 3 shows that, once we allow for more general mechanisms, (pure) sorting
equilibria as characterized in Proposition 5.1 do not exist. The intuition for why this is the case
is simple. Consider a buyer that posts a price which only attracts low type sellers. If the set of
available mechanisms were not restricted to posted prices, a buyer could post a more general mech-
anism, analogous to an auction, that yields the same trading probability and expected transfer for
low type sellers as the posted price, but also attracts some high type sellers. Since buyers have no
capacity constraints, these additional meetings would not crowd out any meetings with low type
sellers. Hence this mechanism would attract the same number of low type sellers, and the buyer
would obtain the same expected payoff from them; on top of that, the buyer can make some positive
profits from high type sellers.
Given these rather different properties of the allocation at a competitive search equilibrium
with price posting and at one with general direct mechanisms, as characterized in our Theorem
3.1, it is then of interest to compare the two in terms of welfare. If the gains from trade for the
low quality good exceed the gains from trade for the high quality good, the latter, as we showed
in Proposition 4.2, maximizes social surplus. Hence this equilibrium, featuring ex-post screening,
always dominates the price posting one with ex-ante sorting in terms of total surplus. On the other
hand, if adverse selection is more severe and gains from trade are larger for the high quality good,
the equilibrium with general mechanisms can be constrained inefficient, as shown in Proposition
4.3, not only because the mechanism traded in equilibrium gives priority to the good with the
lower gains from trade but also because there can be rationing on top of the meeting friction. One
might conjecture that the separating equilibrium with price posting may do better in such cases.
However, we find that this is typically not the case,43 as the next numerical example illustrates.
Example 1: Let λp = λ
p
= 1 and c = 0, c = 1, v = 1, v = 3. Thus, the gains from trade
for the high quality good are twice as large as those for the low quality and there are twice as
many buyers as sellers, half of whom have a high quality good. Under this specification, we have
1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≥ v−cv−c , that is we are in parameter region III. The equilibrium with general direct
mechanisms is then as characterized in Proposition 3.12 and features rationing. In particular, a
43That is, in all numerical simulations we considered such that parameters fall into region III, the social surplus in
the equilibrium with general directed mechanisms exceeds that in the price posting equilibrium.
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buyer’s probability to trade, respectively, a high and low quality good is given by
λ
p
x = λ
p
e−λ
p v − c
v − c ≈ 0.123
λpx = 1− e−λp ≈ 0.632
while a buyer’s probability to meet some high type seller without meeting a low type seller is equal
to e−λ
p
(1− e−λp) ≈ 0.233.
In the equilibrium with price posting, a fraction γ ≈ 0.120 of buyers post the high price, while the
remaining fraction of buyers post a low price. A buyer’s probability to trade a high and low quality
good is now
γλ
p
x = γ
(
1− e−λp
)
≈ 0.120
(1− γ)λpx = (1− γ)
(
1− e−λp
)
≈ 0.598
In the above example, a buyer’s probability of meeting a seller in the equilibrium with general
direct mechanisms is 86.5% while that of meeting only high type sellers is 23.3%. The buyer’s prob-
ability of trading the high quality good is considerably lower (12.3%), hence in meetings without
low type sellers trade occurs only slightly more than half of the time. Comparing these num-
bers with the corresponding ones in the price posting equilibrium, we see that in the latter the
probability that a buyer meets a seller decreases to 71.8%. This is due to the search friction, as
allocating buyers and sellers over two submarkets with different seller-buyer ratios implies that
there is a higher chance that sellers end up misallocated across buyers. Likewise, the probability of
trading a low quality good is lower in the price posting equilibrium since low type sellers distribute
themselves only across a fraction of buyers rather than across all of them. In Example 1 also the
probability of trading a high quality good decreases slightly from 12.3% to 12.0%. To gain some
understanding of why the probability of trading high quality does not increase in the separating
equilibrium notice the following features. Incentive compatibility for low type sellers requires that
the seller-buyer ratio in the high quality market is higher than in the low quality market. This
implies that a buyer’s probability of meeting a high type seller strictly exceeds that of meeting a
low type seller. Since in equilibrium buyers have to be indifferent between attracting high and low
type sellers, it follows that, conditional on meeting a seller, a buyer has to make lower profits with
high than with low type sellers. This in turn implies that most of the gains from trade of the high
quality good have to go to high type sellers, which can only be incentive compatible if a high type
seller’s trading probability is sufficiently low, similar to the case of general direct mechanisms.
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It is interesting to point out that parameter region III includes as a limiting case the specifica-
tion of parameter values for which buyers make zero profits in equilibrium. This case is of interest
since it corresponds to the situation considered in Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) classic model
of adverse selection as well as in other models where there is free entry of uninformed traders (or
equivalently, each uninformed trader can trade any number of contracts). An analogous situation
can be obtained in our environment by letting the measure of buyers tend to +∞. As b → +∞,
the ratio of high type sellers to buyers, λ
p
, tends to zero, implying that 1
λ
p (1 − e−λp) tends to
one. We are thus in the third parameter region of the equilibrium with general direct mechanisms.
From the expressions in Proposition 3.12 it can be seen that, as b→ +∞, the transfer to low type
sellers conditional on trading converges to v, while their trading probability converges to one;44 the
transfer to high type sellers conditional on trading, on the other hand, converges to v, while their
trading probability converges to v−cv−c . These trading probabilities and transfers precisely correspond
to the ones of the separating candidate equilibrium found by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).45 It is
interesting to notice that in this case the equilibrium allocation when mechanisms are restricted to
posted prices converges to the same limit: here we have two separate markets, one in which buyers
post price v and sellers trade with probability one, another in which buyers post price v and the
ratio between sellers and buyers λ
p
γ is such that high type sellers trade with probability
v−c
v−c .
46
At the same time, we should point out that there are also environments in which the price
posting equilibrium yields strictly more surplus than the equilibrium with general mechanisms.
It is interesting to observe that this reversal does not arise when the latter equilibrium features
rationing (as in the previous example), but rather when parameters fall into region II, where every
meeting leads to trade. The next proposition shows that, provided the gains from trade for the high
quality good exceed those for the low quality good, as the measure of high type sellers becomes
sufficiently large the price posting equilibrium yields a strictly larger social surplus compared to
the equilibrium with general mechanisms.
Proposition 5.2. Assume v − c < v − c. If the measure of high type sellers tends to +∞, social
surplus is strictly greater when buyers are restricted to posted prices compared to when they can
post general mechanisms.
Proof See Appendix A.11.
44As b→ +∞, a seller’s probability of being alone in a meeting with a buyer converges to one.
45Note that in competitive search models, as well as in Walrasian models, the non-existence issue found by Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976) in a strategic setting does not arise.
46Formally, this result can be obtained by noting that, as λ
p → 0, the indifference condition of buyers - condition
(12) in the proof of Proposition 5.1 - can only be satisfied if γ → 0 so that 1
λp
γ
(
1− e−λ
p
γ
)
→ v−c
v−c .
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The above result can be explained as follows. For the equilibrium with general mechanisms,
the conditions v − c < v − c and λp → +∞ imply that we are in parameter region II, where the
equilibrium features no rationing. The property that low type sellers are given priority in every
meeting implies that buyers trade the low quality good with probability 1− e−λp , the probability
with which they meet at least one low type seller. As λ
p → +∞, a buyer’s probability of meeting
some high type seller tends to one, which, given the no rationing property, implies that in the limit
buyers trade a high quality good with the residual probability, e−λ
p
. Social surplus thus tends to
b[e−λ
p
(v − c) + (1− e−λp)(v − c)].
In the price posting equilibrium social surplus is strictly higher because, as λ
p → +∞, the
fraction of buyers attracting high type sellers, γ, tends to one. In this equilibrium the trading
probability of sellers in fact converges to zero in both submarkets, but the relative probability of
trade in the high quality submarket compared to the low quality submarket is sufficiently small
so that the incentive compatibility constraint of low type sellers is satisfied. As a consequence,
the probability that a buyer trades tends to one in both submarkets and the measure of buyers
posting the high price tends to b. In the limit, social surplus in the price posting equilibrium is
thus given by b(v − c), which is equal to the first best level and strictly exceeds social surplus in
the equilibrium with general mechanisms. Due to the property that in the latter equilibrium low
type sellers are given priority over high type sellers, the difference in social surplus between the
two types of equilibria is largest when also the measure of low type sellers is large, illustrated in
the following example.
Example 2: Let λ
p
= 8, λp = 2 and c = 0, c < 1.5, v = 2.5, v = 4. Again the gains of
trade for the high quality good are strictly greater than those for the low quality good. However,
compared to Example 1, for every buyer there are eight high type sellers and two low type sellers.
Under this specification, we have 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
< v−cv−c , we are thus in parameter region II, where the
equilibrium with general mechanisms features no rationing. In this equilibrium, a buyer’s probability
to trade, respectively, a high and a low quality good is given by
λ
p
x = e−λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≈ 0.135
λpx = 1− e−λp ≈ 0.865
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In the equilibrium with price posting, the fraction of buyers posting the high price is γ ≈ 0.392 and
the probability a buyer trades, respectively a high and low quality good is given by
βλx = β
(
1− e− µˆβ λˆ
)
≈ 0.392
(1− β)λx = (1− β)
(
1− e− 1−µˆ1−β λˆ
)
≈ 0.585
In Example 2, there are ten sellers for every buyer, of whom 80% have a high quality good.
Due to the high seller-buyer ratio, in the equilibrium with general direct mechanisms the trading
probability for buyers is close to one, but only 13.5% of buyers end up purchasing a high quality
good. This is due to the fact that there are twice as many low type sellers as buyers, so that the
probability that a buyer meets some low type seller is equal to 86.5%. Thus, although the majority
of sellers have a high quality good, the feature that low type sellers are given priority in any match,
together with a large seller-buyer ratio, implies that high quality is traded relatively rarely. In the
equilibrium with price posting, on the other hand, the probability that a buyer trades is slightly
lower (97, 7%), but the probability of trading a high quality good is considerably higher (almost
40%). Whether this leads to an increase in surplus or not depends on the seller’s valuation of the
high quality good. If c is sufficiently small, then the effect of the increased probability of trade of
the high quality object outweighs the effect of the reduced overall probability of trade and surplus
is larger in the sorting equilibrium. In our numerical example this requires c < 1.28.
To sum up, this section has demonstrated that the features of the meeting technology and
hence of the possible trading mechanisms between buyers and sellers have important and nontrivial
implications for the properties of equilibrium allocations, and in particular welfare. While for most
parameter specifications, the equilibrium with general mechanisms yields a higher level of social
surplus than the equilibrium when mechanisms are restricted to price posting, this is not always
the case. Hence, there are some situations in which policies imposing restrictions on the meeting
technology or on the set of available mechanisms are beneficial, but in several other situations
improving policies are those that encourage meetings without capacity constraints, where buyers
can multiple sellers.47
47Lester et al. (2015b) study a related issue in an environment with random search and imperfect competition.
In particular, they examine how the features of the meeting technology affect traders’ market power and hence the
consequences for the welfare properties of equilibria in the presence of adverse selection.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
If: We first show that for any vector (x, x, t, t) satisfying conditions (7)-(11), there exists a feasible
and incentive compatible mechanism m such that xm(λ, λ) = x, xm(λ, λ) = x and tm(λ, λ) =
t, tm(λ, λ) = t. Consider the following mechanism
Xm(L,H) = ρ
1
L+αH , Tm(L,H) = t, L ≥ 1
Xm(L,H) = ρ
α
L+αH , Tm(L,H) = t, H ≥ 1
for some α, ρ, ρ ∈ [0, 1]. For the case α = 0, let Xm(0, H) = ρ 1H .
This mechanism trivially satisfies tm(λ, λ) = t and tm(λ, λ) = t. We now show that there always
exists some tuple (α, ρ, ρ) such that xm(λ, λ) = x and xm(λ, λ) = x. Ex-ante trading probabilities
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are given by
xm(λ, λ) = ρ
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
1
L+ 1 + αH
xm(λ, λ) = ρ
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
α
L+ α(H + 1)
Define the function
f(α) =
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
1
L+ 1 + αH
Note that f ′(α) < 0. The function’s range is given by
[
1
λ+λ
(
1− e−λ−λ
)
, 1λ
(
1− e−λ)]. To see
this, consider first the case α = 0:
f(0) =
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
1
L+ 1
=
+∞∑
L=0
PL(λ)
1
L+ 1
+∞∑
H=0
PH(λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=
1
λ
+∞∑
L=0
λL+1
(L+ 1)!
e−λ =
1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
Consider next the case α = 1:
f(1) =
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
1
L+ 1 +H
=
+∞∑
N=0
PN (λ+ λ)
1
N + 1
=
1
λ+ λ
(
1− e−λ−λ
)
Next, define the function
g(α) =
{ ∑+∞
H=0
∑+∞
L=0 PH(λ)PL(λ)
α
L+α(H+1) if α > 0∑+∞
H=0 PH(λ)PL(λ)
1
H+1 if α = 0
Note that g′(α) > 0 and that g is continuous at α = 0, i.e. limα→0 g(α) = g(0). At α = 1, g is
equal to f . At α = 0, we have
g(0) =
+∞∑
H=0
PH(λ)P0(λ)
1
H + 1
= e−λ
+∞∑
H=0
λ
H
H!
e−λ
1
H + 1
=
e−λ
λ
+∞∑
H=0
λ
H+1
(H + 1)!
e−λ = e−λ
1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
The range of g is consequently
[
e−λ 1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
, 1
λ+λ
(
1− e−λ−λ
)]
.
With this we can show that for any x and x satisfying conditions (9)-(11) we can find some
α, ρ, ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that ρf(α) = x and ρg(α) = x. Given that x, x ≥ 0 and and ρ, ρ ∈ [0, 1], this
can be satisfied if there exists an α such that f(α) ≥ x and g(α) ≥ x. The first inequality requires
that α is not too large, while the second requires that α is not too small. Consider first the case
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in which x ≤ 1
λ+λ
(
1− e−λ−λ
)
. Here f(α) ≥ x is satisfied for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Conditions (7),(8) and
(11) together imply x ≤ 1
λ+λ
(
1− e−λ−λ
)
, from which it follows that g(α) ≥ x can be satisfied
(e.g. α = 1). Consider now the case x ≥ 1
λ+λ
(
1− e−λ−λ
)
and let α˜ be such that f(α˜) = x. We
can show
λg(α˜) + λf(α˜) = λ
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
α˜
L+ α˜(H + 1)
+ λ
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
1
L+ 1 + α˜H
= λ
+∞∑
H=1
+∞∑
L=0
λ
H−1
(H − 1)!
λL
L!
e−λ−λ
α˜
L+ α˜H
H
H
+ λ
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=1
λ
H
H!
λL−1
(L− 1)!
1
L+ α˜H
L
L
=
+∞∑
H=1
+∞∑
L=1
λ
H
H!
λL
L!
e−λ−λ
 α˜HL+ α˜H + LL+ α˜H︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ +∞∑
H=1
λ
H
H!
e−λ−λ +
+∞∑
L=1
λL
L!
e−λ−λ
=
(
1− e−λ − e−λ + e−λ−λ
)
+
(
e−λ − e−λ−λ
)
+
(
e−λ − e−λ−λ
)
= 1− e−λ−λ
With this,
g(α˜) =
1
λ
(
1− e−λ−λ − λf(α˜)
)
=
1
λ
(
1− e−λ−λ − λx
)
≥ x
where the last inequality follows from condition (11). Thus, there exists some ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that
ρg(α˜) = x. Together this implies that for any x and x satisfying conditions (9)-(11), there exists
some α, ρ, ρ ∈ [0, 1] such that xm(λ, λ) = x and xm(λ, λ) = x.
Finally we need to check feasibility and incentive compatibility of the proposed mechanism.
Feasibility follows from
x(L,H)L+ x(L,H)H = ρ
1
L+ αH
L+ ρ
α
L+ αH
H ≤ 1
L+ αH
L+
α
L+ αH
H = 1.
Incentive compatibility is trivially satisfied given that xm(λ, λ) = x, xm(λ, λ) = x and tm(λ, λ) =
t, tm(λ, λ) = t.
Only if: We now want to show that for any feasible and incentive compatible mechanism
m, expected trading probabilities and prices satisfy conditions (7)-(11). Let x = xm(λ, λ), x =
xm(λ, λ) and t = tm(λ, λ), t = tm(λ, λ). Incentive compatibility of m then trivially implies (7)
and (8). Feasibility will imply the remaining conditions. To see this, note first that Xm(L,H)L+
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Xm(L,H)H ≤ 1, ∀L,H requires Xm(L,H) ≤ 1L , which in turn implies
xm(λ, λ) =
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)Xm(L+ 1, H) ≤
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
1
L+ 1
=
1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
Analogously it can be shown that Xm(L,H) ≤ 1H implies xm(λ, λ) ≤ 1λ
(
1− e−λ
)
. From the
perspective of a buyer the probability of trading a low quality good is given by
+∞∑
L=1
+∞∑
H=0
λL
L!
e−λ
λ
H
H!
e−λXm(L,H)L = λ
+∞∑
L=0
+∞∑
H=0
λL
L!
e−λ
λ
H
H!
e−λXm(L+ 1, H) = λxm(λ, λ)
Similarly, the probability for a buyer to trade a high quality good can be shown to equal λxm(λ, λ).
Feasibility then implies
λxm(λ, λ) + λxm(λ, λ) =
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ)
(
Xm(L,H)L+Xm(L,H)H
)
≤
+∞∑
H=0
+∞∑
L=0
PH(λ)PL(λ) · 1− P0(λ)P0(λ)
= 1− e−λ−λ
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
• U > U : Let (x, t) and (x, t) be some expected trading probabilities and transfers at the
mechanisms (possibly different) chosen by low and high type sellers at a given equilibrium.
Market utilities are then given by U = t−xc and U = t−xc. Incentive compatibility (within
or across mechanisms) for the low type seller requires t− xc ≥ t− xc, which can be rewritten
as x(c − c) ≤ U − U . Since x ≥ 0, this inequality can only be satisfied if U ≥ U . If U = U ,
then x = 0. Since buyers cannot make negative profits from any type of seller, this implies
t = 0 and consequently U = U = 0. If x = 0, then buyers make zero profits. In this case, a
buyer can deviate to a posted price ε > 0. This deviation attracts all the sellers and yields a
positive profit as long as ε is small enough. If x > 0, a buyer’s equilibrium payoff is smaller
or equal than
(
1− e−λp) (v− c). A buyer can then deviate to an alternative mechanism with
λ′ > λp, x′ = 1
λ′
(
1− e−λ′
)
, t′ = x′c and λ′ = x′ = t′ = 0. This mechanism satisfies all the
constraints and yields a payoff equal to
(
1− e−λ′
)
(v − c) > (1− e−λp) (v − c).
• U −U < c− c: Here, incentive compatibility (within or across mechanisms) for the high type
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seller requires t− xc ≥ t− xc, which can be rewritten as x(c− c) ≥ U −U . Note that x < 1,
which follows directly from the condition x ≤ 1λ
(
1− e−λ) < 1, where the last inequality is a
general property for all λ ∈ (0,+∞).48 Hence, incentive compatibility can only be satisfied if
U − U < c− c.
• U,U > 0: Suppose U = 0. The expected profit a buyer makes trading with high type sellers
is given by λ[xv− t] = λx(v− c). Consider an increase in λ together with a reduction in x so
as to keep λx unchanged. Adjusting t in order to keep the utility of high type sellers constant,
this change is incentive compatible. Also, it increases 1 − e−λ−λ, thereby relaxing the last
feasibility constraint of P aux. The buyer can then always increase his payoff by increasing the
value of λ, while still satisfying all constraints of P aux. In order for P aux to have a solution,
we thus need U > 0. Given that U > U , as established above, this immediately implies
U > 0.
• U < v − c, U < v − c: Suppose U ≥ v − c. Given that λ > 0 implies x < 1 (see above), a
buyer’s payoff when meeting a high type seller, given by x(v−c)−U , is strictly negative when
λ > 0. The optimal value of λ is thus equal to zero. By a perfectly symmetric argument,
U ≥ v − c implies that the optimal value of λ is equal to zero. Given that these values are
not compatible with an equilibrium, we have U < v − c, U < v − c.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Consider the Lagrange problem
L = λ [x(v − c)− U]+ λ [x(v − c)− U ] + γ1(U − U
c− c − x
)
+ γ2
(
x− U + U
c− c
)
+γ3
(
1− e−λ − λx
)
+ γ4
(
1− e−λ−λ − λx− λx
)
+ γ5λ+ γ6λ
The first-order conditions of the problem with respect x, x and λ, λ are given by
x : λ(v − c)− γ1 − γ4λ = 0 (27)
x : λ(v − c) + γ2 − (γ3 + γ4)λ = 0 (28)
λ : x(v − c)− U + γ4
(
e−λ−λ − x
)
+ γ5 = 0 (29)
λ : x(v − c)− U + γ3
(
e−λ − x)+ γ4 (e−λ−λ − x)+ γ6 = 0 (30)
48See footnote 14.
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If γ6 > 0 such that λ = 0, constraint (14) is always satisfied with equality. We are thus interested
in the case γ6 = 0 and λ > 0. Assuming γ3 = 0 and solving for the remaining Lagrange-multipliers
yields
γ4 =
x(v − c)− U
x− e−λ−λ
γ1 = λ
(
(v − c)− x(v − c)− U
x− e−λ−λ
)
γ2 = λ
(
e−λ−λ(v − c)− U
x− e−λ−λ
)
γ5 =
x− e−λ−λ
x− e−λ−λ (x(v − c)− U)− (x(v − c)− U)
Suppose first that γ2 = 0. This requires e
−λ−λ(v−c) = U , which implies γ4 = v−c. Non-negativity
of γ1 = λ[(v − c)− (v − c)] then requires either λ = 0 or v − c ≥ v − c or both. If λ = 0, constraint
(14) coincides with constraint (15), which, given that γ4 = v − c > 0, implies that (14) is satisfied
with equality. If λ > 0, then γ5 = 0 requires
U − U = −x[(v − c)− (v − c)]
Given v − c ≥ v − c, this equality can be satisfied only if U = U , ruled out by Lemma 3.3.
Suppose now γ2 > 0. Here x =
U−U
c−c . Assuming first γ1 > 0, we have x = x =
U−U
c−c , which
implies
γ5 = [x(v − c)− U ]− [x(v − c)− U ] = −v − v
c− c (U − U)
This term is strictly negative unless v = v. If v = v, then γ4 ≥ 0 requires U(v − c) ≥ U(v − c).
Substituting the value of x, the conditions for γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 0, respectively, can be rewritten as
U − e−λ−λ(v − c)
U−U
c−c − e−λ−λ
≥ 0 and U − e
−λ−λ(v − c)
U−U
c−c − e−λ−λ
< 0
However, given that U(v − c) ≥ U(v − c), we have
U − e−λ−λ(v − c)
U−U
c−c − e−λ−λ
≤ v − c
v − c
U − e−λ−λ(v − c)
U−U
c−c − e−λ−λ
<
U − e−λ−λ(v − c)
U−U
c−c − e−λ−λ
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A contradiction. Suppose next that γ1 = 0. This implies either λ = 0 or (v − c)− x(v−c)−U
x−e−λ−λ = 0 or
both. If λ = 0, constraints (14) and (15) again coincide. For condition (14) not to be satisfied with
equality, we need γ4 = 0. This cannot be solution to the optimization problem since a marginal
increase in x is both feasible and incentive compatible and increases the buyer’s payoff strictly. On
the other hand, if λ > 0, then γ5 = 0 implies
x(v − c)− U
x− e−λ−λ =
x(v − c)− U
x− e−λ−λ (31)
With this, we have γ1 = λ
U−e−λ−λ(v−c)
x−e−λ−λ , which, given λ > 0, equals zero if and only if U =
e−λ−λ(v − c). Substituting this value of U into condition (31) yields x(v−c)−U
x−e−λ−λ = v − c. Using
this equality, the second and fourth Lagrange multiplier simplify to γ2 = λ[(v − c) − (v − c)] and
γ4 = v− c. Strict positivity of γ2 then requires v− c > v− c. However, rewriting the condition (31)
as x[(v−c)− (v−c)] = U −U shows that U > U in fact requires v−c > v−c. A contradiction.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.5
The Lagrange optimization problem associated to relaxed problem (A) corresponds to the one
introduced in proof A.3, where γ1 and γ2 are set equal to zero and the trading probabilities are
set to x = 1λ
(
1− e−λ) for λ > 0 and x = e−λ 1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
for λ > 0. Considering the first-order
conditions (27)-(30), there are four cases to be distinguished.
• λ, λ = 0 : For this case the set of first-order conditions can always be satisfied. The buyer’s
payoff associated to this solution is equal to zero.
• λ = 0, λ > 0 : (27) implies γ4 = v−c. λ > 0 requires γ5 = 0. (29) then implies e−λ(v−c) = U
or equivalently λ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
.
• λ > 0, λ = 0 : (28) implies γ3 + γ4 = v − c. λ > 0 requires γ6 = 0. (30) then implies
e−λ(v − c) = U or equivalently λ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
. A necessary condition for positivity of γ5 is
U − U < (v − c)− (v − c) (see condition (29)).
• λ, λ > 0 : (27) implies γ4 = v − c and (28) implies γ3 = (v − c) − (v − c). λ > 0 requires
γ5 = 0. (29) then implies
e−λ−λ(v − c) = U (32)
λ > 0 requires γ6 = 0. (30) then requires
e−λ[(v − c)− (v − c)] + e−λ−λ(v − c) = U (33)
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Substituting (32) into (33) yields
e−λ[(v − c)− (v − c)] = U − U
This equality has a solution if U − U ≤ (v − c)− (v − c), in which case λ = ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
.
λ is then pinned down by (32):
e−λ
U − U
(v − c)− (v − c) =
U
v − c .
This equation has a solution if U−U(v−c)−(v−c) ≥ Uv−c or equivalently Uv−c ≥ Uv−c , in which case
λ = ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
)
We can first show that a finite solution exists. To see this, we need to consider λ → +∞ and
λ→ +∞. It can be easily seen that the buyer’s payoff in both cases tends to −∞, that is
lim
λ→+∞
[
e−λ
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c) +
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c)− λU − λU
]
= lim
λ→+∞
[
e−λ
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c) +
(
1− e−λ
)
(v − c)− λU − λU
]
= −∞
We then need to demonstrate which solution obtains for different values of U,U . Consider first
the case U − U ≥ (v − c) − (v − c). Here the solutions to first-order conditions (27-30) are given
by λ, λ = 0 and λ = 0, λ = v−c
U
. The latter solves the buyer’s optimization problem if it yields
a strictly positive payoff. The buyer’s payoff pˆi(λ, λ) associated to the solution λ = 0, λ = v−c
U
is
given by
pˆi
(
0,
v − c
U
)
= (v − c)− U − ln
(
v − c
U
)
U = U
v − cU − ln
(
v − c
U
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
−1
 > 0,
where the inequality follows directly from x − lnx > 1,∀x > 1. If U − U ≥ (v − c) − (v − c), the
solution is thus given by λ = 0, λ = v−c
U
.
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Consider next the case Uv−c ≤ Uv−c . Here, the three solutions to the first-order conditions (27-30)
are λ, λ = 0, λ = 0, λ = v−c
U
and λ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ = 0. The latter pair yields payoff
pˆi
(
ln
(
v − c
U
)
, 0
)
= (v − c)− U − ln
(
v − c
U
)
U︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(1−e−λ−λe−λ)(v−c)
> (v − c)− U − ln
(
v − c
U
)
U︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
(
1−e−λ′−λ′e−λ′
)
(v−c)
> 0
where λ
′
= ln
(
v−c
U
)
. The first inequality follows from λ
′
= ln
(
v−c
U
)
≤ ln
(
v−c
U
)
= λ, the fact that
the probability of at least two arrivals (1− e−x − xe−x) strictly increases in the arrival rate x, and
that Uv−c ≤ Uv−c implies v − c > v − c. If Uv−c ≤ Uv−c , the solution to the optimization problem is
thus given by λ = 0, λ = ln
(
v−c
U
)
.
Finally, consider the case U − U < (v − c) − (v − c) and Uv−c > Uv−c . Here, we show that the
interior solution λ = ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
, λ = ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
)
yields the largest payoff. To see
this, suppose instead that the solution to problem (A) is given by λ = 0, λ = v−c
U
and consider
any pair U,U such that the parameter restrictions are satisfied. Consider now an alternative pair
U ′, U with U ′ > U such that U ′ − U = (v − c) − (v − c). For the pair U ′, U the interior solution
λ = ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U ′−U
)
, λ = ln
(
U ′−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
)
coincides with the corner solution λ = 0, λ = v−c
U
.
Noting that
∂pˆi
(
0, v−c
U
)
∂U = 0 and
∂pˆi
(
ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
, ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
))
∂U
= − ln
(
(v − c)− (v − c)
U − U
)
< 0
the inequality U < U
′
implies that for the pair U,U the solution λ = ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
, λ =
ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
)
must yield a strictly larger payoff than λ = 0, λ = v−c
U
.
Analogously it can be shown that the interior solution yields a larger payoff than λ = v−cU , λ = 0.
Here we consider a pair U,U
′
, this time with U
′
> U such that Uv−c =
U
v−c . For the pair U,U
′
the
interior solution coincides with the corner solution λ = v−cU , λ = 0. Noting that
∂pˆi
(
v−c
U
,0
)
∂U
= 0 and
∂pˆi
(
ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
, ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
))
∂U
= − ln
(
U − U
(v − c)− (v − c)
v − c
U
)
< 0
the inequality U < U
′
then implies that for the pair U,U the solution λ = ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
, λ =
ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
)
must yield a strictly larger payoff than λ = v−cU , λ = 0. Given that the latter
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pair yields a strictly positive payoff, we can conclude that if U−U < (v−c)−(v−c) and Uv−c > Uv−c ,
the pair λ = ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
, λ = ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
)
indeed solves problem (A).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Consider first the case Uv−c ≥ Uv−c such that λ
∗
= 0. Given that U > U , this inequality implies
v − c > v − c. Incentive compatibility for the low type seller can always be satisfied by setting
x small enough. Incentive compatibility for the high type seller then requires x∗ ≥ U−Uc−c . This is
always satisfied, as can be seen from the following inequalities:
x∗ =
1
ln
(
v−c
U
) (1− U
v − c
)
> e
− ln
(
v−c
U
)
=
U
v − c >
(
1− v − v
c− c
)
U
v − c =
U − v−cv−cU
c− c ≥
U − U
c− c
The first inequality comes from the fact that 1x(1− e−x) > e−x ⇔ 1− e−x > xe−x, where 1− e−x is
the probability of at least one arrival given arrival rate x, while xe−x is the probability of exactly
one arrival given arrival rate x. The second inequality follows from v − c > v − c and the third
inequality follows from Uv−c ≥ Uv−c .
Consider next the case U − U ≥ (v − c) − (v − c) such that λ∗ = 0. Note that the parameter
restriction can only be satisfied if v < v as we required U − U < c− c. Incentive compatibility for
the low type seller is satisfied if 1
λ
∗ (1− e−λ
∗
) ≤ U−Uc−c . Substituting λ
∗
= ln
(
v−c
U
)
, that is
[
ln
(
v − c
U
)]−1(
1− U
(v − c)
)
≤ U − U
c− c
Incentive compatibility for the high type seller can always be satisfied by setting x large enough.
Finally, consider the case in which λ∗ = ln
(
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c
U
)
and λ∗ = ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
)
. Incen-
tive compatibility for the low type seller is satisfied if e−λ
∗ 1
λ
∗ (1 − e−λ
∗
) ≤ U−Uc−c . Substituting λ∗
and λ
∗
, this inequality can be rewritten as
[
ln
(
U − U
(v − c)− (v − c)
)
− ln
(
U
v − c
)]−1(
U − U
(v − c)− (v − c) −
U
v − c
)
≤ U − U
c− c .
Incentive compatibility for the high type seller is generally satisfied, which follows from
x∗ =
1
ln
(
(v−c)−(v−c)
U−U
) (1− U − U
(v − c)− (v − c)
)
≥ 1
ln
(
c−c
U−U
) (1− U − U
c− c
)
> e
− ln
(
c−c
U−U
)
=
U − U
c− c
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The first inequality comes from the fact that 1x(1− e−x) is strictly decreasing in x and that v ≥ v.
The second inequality again follows from 1x(1− e−x) > e−x.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3.8
Suppose U(v − c) = U(v − c). Substituting the value of x∗, constraint (15) can be written as
λ
∗
x∗ ≤ e−λ∗
(
1− e−λ∗
)
Noting that
x∗ =
U − U
c− c =
(
1− v−cv−c
)
c− c e
−λ∗(v − c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=U
= e−λ
∗ v − c
v − c
we obtain that feasibility is satisfied if and only if
λ
∗ v − c
v − c ≤
(
1− e−λ∗
)
Given that 1
λ
∗
(
1− e−λ∗
)
strictly decreases in λ
∗49 with limλ∗→0
1
λ
∗
(
1− e−λ∗
)
= 1, this inequality
is satisfied if and only if λ
∗ ≤ λmax, where λmax is such that λmax v−cv−c =
(
1− e−λmax
)
. Note that
λ
max
is strictly positive if and only if v < v.
If λ
∗ ≤ λmax, also the incentive compatibility constraint (13) is satisfied. Given that x∗ = U−Uc−c ,
we simply need to show that x∗ ≥ x∗. This can be seen from the following set of inequalities
x∗ =
1
λ∗
(
1− e−λ∗
)
> e−λ
∗
> e−λ
∗ 1
λ
∗
(
1− e−λ∗
)
≥ x∗
where the first inequality again follows from 1− e−x > xe−x,∀x > 0 (see proof A.5).
A.7 Proof of Lemma 3.9
This problem can be broken up in two parts. Consider first the case λ = 0. Here the value of λ
is not pinned down by the constraint of problem (C) but can be picked freely. The optimal value
of λ is given by ln
(
v−c
U
)
.50 Consider next the case of λ > 0. Here the constraint of problem (C)
uniquely pins down the value of λ as a function of λ. That is,
e−λ
1
λ
(
1− e−λ
)
=
U − U
c− c ⇔ λ = ln
(
λ
1− e−λ
c− c
U − U
)
49See footnote 14.
50For λ = 0, the buyer’s objective is concave in λ and the first order condition with respect to λ is given by
e−λ(v − c) = U .
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for all λ ∈ (0, λc], where λc is such that 1
λ
c
(
1− e−λc
)
= U−Uc−c .
51 For λ > λ
c
, the constraint cannot
be satisfied, implying that those values of λ are not admissible. The buyer’s objective as a function
of λ on the subdomain (0, λ
c
] is then given by
p˜i(λ) = λ
U − U
c− c (v − c) +
(
1− λ
1− e−λ
U − U
c− c
)
(v − c)− λU − ln
(
1− e−λ
λ
c− c
U − U
)
U
The first two derivatives with respect to λ are
∂p˜i
∂λ
= (v − c)U − U
c− c − e
λ e
λ − λ− 1
(eλ − 1)2 (v − c)
U − U
c− c +
eλ − λeλ − 1
λ(eλ − 1) U
∂2p˜i
∂λ
2 = e
λ 2(e
λ − 1)− λ(eλ + 1)
(eλ − 1)3 (v − c)
U − U
c− c +
λ
2
eλ − (eλ − 1)2
λ
2
(eλ − 1)2
U
We can show that the second derivative is strictly negative for all λ > 0. This will be done by
showing that the numerators of both terms in ∂
2p˜i
∂λ
2 are strictly negative. The numerator of the first
term is equal to zero at λ = 0 and strictly decreasing for all λ > 0:
∂
(
2(eλ − 1)− λ(eλ + 1)
)
∂λ
= −λeλ
(
1− 1
λ
(1− e−λ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0,
implying that 2(eλ− 1)−λ(eλ + 1) < 0, ∀λ > 0. To see that also the numerator of the second term
is negative, we need to show that
(eλ − 1)2 > λ2eλ ⇔ 1− e−λ − λe−λ2 > 0.
Given that 1 − e−λ − λe−λ2 is equal to zero at λ = 0, this can be shown by demonstrating that
1− e−λ − λe−λ2 is strictly increasing in λ. The first derivative of this term is given by
∂
(
1− e−λ − λe−λ2
)
∂λ
= e−λ
[
1
2
λ−
(
1− e−λ2
)]
Note that 1−e−λ2 is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function with a function value of zero and
a slope of 12 at λ = 0. The linear function
1
2λ is thus tangent to 1−e−
λ
2 at λ = 0. This implies that
the graph of 12λ lies strictly above the graph of 1 − e−
λ
2 , proving that e−λ
[
1
2λ−
(
1− e−λ2
)]
> 0
for all λ > 0.
51Note the limit lim
λ→0
(
ln
(
λ
1− e−λ
c− c
U − U
))
= ln
(
c− c
U − U
)
differs from the optimal value of λ at λ = 0.
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Taken together, this implies that
∂2p˜i
∂λ
2 < 0,∀λ > 0, that is the buyer’s objective as a function of
λ is strictly concave on (0, λ
c
]. Let λint, λ
int
denote the pair of values that maximizes the buyer’s
objective on the subdomain (0, λ
c
].
Lastly, we need to check if the objective of problem (C) attains its maximum at the corner
solution λc = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
c
= 0 or at the interior solution λint, λ
int
. If Uv−c >
U
v−c , the unique
solution of relaxed problem (B) solves the buyer’s auxiliary problem. Given that the corner solution
λc, λ
c
coincides with that solution, it must yield a strictly higher payoff than the pair λint, λ
int
.
Suppose next Uv−c ≤ Uv−c . Consider the pair λ′, λ
′
with λ′ = v−cU and λ
′
> 0 such that
e−λ
′ 1
λ
′
(
1− e−λ′
)
=
U − U
c− c
The difference between the buyer’s payoff associated to λ′, λ′ and λc, λc is given by the buyer’s
expected payoff from trading with high type sellers
e−λ
′ (
1− e−λ′
)
(v − c)− λ′U = λ′
(
v − c
c− c (U − U)− U
)
= λ
′
(
v − c
c− cU −
v − c
c− cU
)
≥ 0
where the last inequality is strict if Uv−c <
U
v−c . If that is the case, the pair λ
′, λ′ yields a strictly
greater payoff than λc, λ
c
, implying that also the pair λint, λ
int
must yield a strictly greater payoff
than λc, λ
c
.
If Uv−c =
U
v−c , we have λ
′
= λ
max
, with λ
max
as defined in Lemma 3.8. Given that the pair λ′, λ′
solves relaxed problem (B) and satisfies the constraint of problem (C), the pair must also solve
problem (C). The interior solution λint, λ
int
thus coincides with λ′, λ′. Since also the pair λc, λc
solves relaxed problem (B), it follows that whenever Uv−c =
U
v−c , problem (C) has two solutions,
λc = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
c
= 0 and λint = ln
(
v−c
U
)
, λ
int
= λ
max
.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3.11
We need to determine the conditions under which the values of U and U are such that the solution
of problem (A) is not incentive compatible and the solution of problem (B) is not feasible (i.e. does
not exist).
• It follows from Lemma 3.8 that there is no solution to problem (B) if UU < v−cv−c . Substituting
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the values of (23) and (24) into this inequality yields
U
U
− v − c
v − c =
(
1− e−λp − λpe−λp
)
(c− c)
e−2λ
p
(
1− e−λp + λpe−λp
)
(v − c) +
(
1− e−λp
)2
(v − v)
[
1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
− v − c
v − c
]
< 0
The first term is strictly positive, implying that this inequality is satisfied if and only if
1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
< v−cv−c .
• Provided that 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
< v−cv−c and consequently
U
v−c <
U
v−c , we know that the solution
to problem (A) is either characterized by condition (ii) or by condition (iii) of Lemma 3.6. It
is characterized by condition (ii) if and only if U −U < (v− c)− (v− c). Substituting market
utilities (23) and (24) into this inequality yields e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
< 1− v−vc−c .
(ii) Suppose first that the inequality e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
< 1− v−vc−c is satisfied, i.e. that the
solution of problem (A) is interior. According to Lemma 3.6 (ii), this solution is not
incentive compatible if
[
ln
(
U − U
U
v − c
(v − c)− (v − c)
)]−1(
1− U
U − U
(v − c)− (v − c)
v − c
)
> 1− v − v
c− c (34)
Note that the right-hand side of this inequality has the form 1−zln(1/z) , where z =
U
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c .
The term 1−zln(1/z) is strictly increasing in z. Substituting market utilities (23) and (24),
the ratio U
U−U can be written as
U
U − U =
e−λ
p
1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
) v − c
c− c +
1− e−λp
1− 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
) v − v
c− c − 1
This ratio is strictly decreasing λ
p
∂
(
U
U−U
)
∂λ
p = −
λpe−λp
(
1− 1
λp
(1− e−λp)
)
(1− e−λp)2
v − c
c− c +
(1− e−λp)2 − λp2e−λp
(λ
p − (1− e−λp))2
v − v
c− c
 < 0
Both the first and the second term inside the parenthesis are strictly positive, which
follows from 1
λp
(1− e−λp) < 1 and (eλp − 1)2 > λp2eλp ⇔ (1− e−λp)2 > λp2e−λp , as was
shown in proof A.7. Note further that if 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
= 1− v−vc−c , we have
U
U − U = e
−λp v − c
(v − c)− (v − c)
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such that z = U
U−U
(v−c)−(v−c)
v−c = e
−λp . In this case the left-hand side of inequality (34)
is equal to 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
, which in turn is equal to the right-hand side. Now consider a
decrease in λ
p
so that 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
> 1− v−vc−c . This leads to an increase in UU−U , given
the property above, and consequently to an increase in the left-hand side of inequality
(34), while the right-hand side is unaffected. Together, this implies that inequality (34)
is satisfied whenever 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
> 1− v−vc−c .
(iii) Suppose now that e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≥ 1− v−vc−c . Lemma 3.6 (iii) shows that the solution
of problem (A) is not incentive compatible if[
ln
(
v − c
U
)]−1(
1− U
v − c
)
> 1− v − v
c− c (35)
Clearly, at e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
= 1− v−vc−c (or U − U = (v − c)− (v − c)) inequality (35)
coincides with (34). Given that e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
= 1− v−vc−c implies 1λp
(
1− e−λp
)
> 1−
v−v
c−c , (35) is satisfied at this parameter specification. Consider now the case e
−λp 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
>
1− v−vc−c so that U −U > (v − c)− (c− c). Let c′ < c be such that e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
=
1− v−vc−c′ and let U
′
denote the associated utility according to (24). Note that U strictly
increases in c, implying that U
′
< U .52 Note further that the left-hand side of (35) is
again of the form 1−zln(1/z) with z =
U
v−c , which was strictly increasing in z. This implies
[
ln
(
v − c
U
)]−1(
1− U
v − c
)
>
[
ln
(
v − c
U
′
)]−1(
1− U
′
v − c
)
> 1− v − v
c− c
i.e. for e−λ
p 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
> 1− v−vc−c , inequality (35) is always satisfied.
Taken together, this implies that the solution of problem (C) solves P aux if 1 − v−vc−c <
1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
< v−cv−c .
A.9 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Note first that x > x in all parameter regions. This follows directly from the fact that x < e−λ
p
and
x = 1λp
(
1− e−λp) > e−λp (for the latter inequality see proof 3.6). To establish the stated property
in Lemma 4.1, we proceed by contradiction. Let (x, x, t, t) denote the expected trading probabilities
and transfers for a mechanism traded in equilibrium and suppose x(v − c) − U ≤ x(v − c) − U .
52The first derivative of the expression in (24) with respect to c is given by 1
λp
e−λ
p
(
1− e−λp − λpe−λp
)
> 0.
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(x, x, t, t, λ, λ) must then solve the auxiliary optimization problem of the buyers P aux, for λ, λ
consistent with the population parameters. Consider a deviation in which the buyer replaces every
low type seller with a high type seller and adds some more high type sellers, while keeping x, x, t, t
unchanged. That is, λ′ = 0, λ′ = λ + λ + ε with ε > 0. This deviation clearly satisfies the
participation and incentive compatibility constraints of P aux and yields a strictly larger payoff to
the buyer, since x(v − c) − U ≥ x(v − c) − U and ε > 0. This deviation is also feasible for ε
sufficiently small, as replacing low type with high type sellers implies that the average trading
probability decreases (by x > x), while the number of meetings remains constant. Hence, it is
possible to attract a few more high type sellers while still satisfying feasibility. We thus have a
profitable deviation, a contradiction.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Consider first the case 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
≤ v−cv−c . From Propositions 3.10 and 3.11 it follows that
under this restriction, at a pooling equilibrium the feasibility constraint (11) is binding. Consider
an increase in the trading probability of the high type seller by ∆x, while adjusting the trading
probability of the low type seller so that the feasibility constraint is still satisfied as equality:
λ
p
∆x+ λp∆x = 0 ⇔ ∆x = − µ
1− µ∆x
Let us modify the expected transfer to the high type seller so that his utility remains unchanged
∆t = ∆xc
and the expected transfer to the low type seller so that his incentive compatibility constraint is
satisfied
∆t−∆xc = ∆t−∆xc
Substituting the previous equations into the above yields
∆t =
1
1− µ ((1− µ)c− c) ∆x
Note that these changes make high type sellers indifferent and strictly improve the utility of low
type sellers:
∆t−∆xc =
[
1
1− µ ((1− µ)c− c) +
µ
1− µc
]
∆x = c− c > 0
It is immediate to verify that the changes considered always allow to increase total surplus (while
satisfying incentive compatibility and the feasibility constraints imposed by the matching technol-
ogy). To verify that they also constitute a Pareto improvement, we need to show that they also
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make buyers weakly better off. This happens if
λ
p [
∆xv −∆t]+ λp [∆xv −∆t] ≥ 0
⇔ λ
p
1− µ [µ(v − v)− (c− c)] ∆x ≥ 0
The above inequality is satisfied whenever µ ≥ c−cv−v .
Consider now the case 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
> v−cv−c . From Proposition 2.6 it follows that at a com-
petitive equilibrium the feasibility constraint (11) is slack. Consider an increase in the trading
probability of the high type seller ∆x, small enough that (11) is not violated. Modify then the
expected transfer to the high type seller so that his utility is kept constant
∆t = ∆xc
The trading probability of the low type seller is kept unchanged and the expected transfer to the
low type seller is adjusted to ensure that his incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied
∆t−∆xc︸︷︷︸
=0
= ∆t−∆xc ⇔ ∆t = (c− c) ∆x
These changes again make the high type sellers indifferent, strictly improve the low type sellers
(since ∆t > 0), and always increase total surplus. They also make buyers weakly better off and
thus constitute a Pareto improvement if
λ
p [
∆xv −∆t]+ λp [∆xv −∆t] ≥ 0
⇔ λ
p
1− µ [µ(v − c)− (c− c)] ∆x ≥ 0,
which is satisfied whenever µ ≥ c−cv−c .
A.11 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Let WGM and WPP denote social surplus in the equilibrium under general mechanisms and the
equilibrium under price posting, respectively. We are interested in the limiting case of µs→ +∞,
while µs and b are kept finite, implying that λ
p
tends to +∞ and λp is finite.
Consider first the case of general mechanisms. Given the assumption v − c < v − c, the
condition 1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
∈
(
1− v−vc−c , v−cv−c
)
, is always satisfied, meaning that the limiting case falls
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into parameter region II. To see this, note that lim
λ
p→+∞
1
λ
p
(
1− e−λp
)
= 0 and 1− v−vc−c < 0, v−cv−c > 0
for v − c < v − c. The limit of social surplus is thus given by
lim
λ
p→+∞
WGM = lim
λ
p→+∞
b
[(
1− e−λp
)
(v − c) + e−λp
(
1− e−λp
)
(v − c)
]
= b
[(
1− e−λp
)
(v − c) + e−λp(v − c)
]
Consider next the case of price posting. We can first show that as λ
p → +∞, the equilibrium
fraction of buyers going to the high quality market, γ, tends to one. A buyer’s profit in the low
and high quality market, respectively, is given by
pi =
(
1− e− λ
p
1−γ − λ
p
1− γ e
− λp
1−γ
)
(v − c)
pi =
(
1− e− λ
p
1−γ
)
(v − c)− λ
p
γ
e
− λp
1−γ (v − c)
Suppose γ does not tend to one. Then
lim
λ
p→+∞
(
λ
p
γ
e
− λp
1−γ
)
= +∞ ⇒ lim
λ
p→+∞
pi = −∞
implying that the indifference condition for buyers cannot be satisfied. For the limit of λ
p
γ e
− λp
1−γ to be
finite we thus need γ to be a function of λ
p
with limλp→+∞ γ(λ
p
) = 1 such that lim
λ
p→+∞
(
λ
p
γ(λ
p
)
e
− λp
1−γ(λp)
)
=
l ∈ R. The indifference condition for buyers then requires v − c = v − c − l ⇔ l = v − v. With
this, the limit of social surplus in the price posting equilibrium is given by
lim
λ
p→+∞
WPP = lim
λ
p→+∞
b
[
(1− γ(λp))
(
1− e−
λp
1−γ(λp)
)
(v − c) + γ(λp)
(
1− e−
λ
p
γ(λ
p
)
)
(v − c)
]
= b(v − c)
which is strictly greater than limλp→+∞W
GM = b
[(
1− e−λp) (v − c) + e−λp(v − c)].
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